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Political Activism Between Journey and Settlement: Irregular Migrant Mobilisation in Morocco

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ABSTRACT

Research on irregular migrants' political mobilisation focuses particularly on Western countries, conceptualised as final destinations for migrants, and documents how irregular migrants claim rights despite high risks involved. Based on a qualitative research in Morocco, the article explores the conditions under which individual journeys, allegedly to Europe, give rise to political activism by irregular migrants. Thus, it contributes to the literature on irregular migrants' political mobilisation as well as on clandestine journeys. Morocco, identified with "transit migration" at the periphery of the EU, has been subjected to the externalisation of EU migration policies since the early 1990s. Taking a critical approach to the concept of "transit country", the article highlights the implications of the term on migrants' lived experiences of the journey and of settlement, which have encouraged a pro-regularisation movement in Morocco. Facing violent practices, sub-Saharan migrants established informal associations and forged alliances with emerging local and transnational civil society actors. The framing of migrants' demands in relation to the Moroccan democratisation process, African identity, and the Moroccan emigration experience reinforced such alliances and their demands of regularisation. As a partial response to emerging critiques, the Moroccan government announced a new migratory approach and a regularisation campaign implemented throughout 2014. The analysis of migrant mobilisation in Morocco thus provides an important case to trace processes enabling irregular migrants to gain political voice, even in contexts where irregular migration is highly criminalised and stigmatised.

Introduction

André¹ (forty-two) left his country in 2008. He came to Morocco in May 2011, with the intention of going to Europe. He spent several months in Tangier and in the forest near Ceuta and made several attempts to cross: "I have attempted several times in Tangier, several times in Ceuta. It did not work. We could organise among ourselves, buy a zodiac² and attempt When you make several attempts and when it does not work, you need to reflect on it. I told myself, I need to change, I would not say change tactic, but my idea to go to

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Europe. I have decided that I can make my life here and in 2013, the King has given his discourse for integration.” After leaving the forest, in early 2012, André moved to Rabat, applied for asylum and started working temporarily, in construction and as a carrier.

Since then, he has volunteered for associations to raise the profile of migrant demands for rights and for regularisation. He took an active role in the foundation of a sub-Saharan migrant association. The association was founded to raise awareness against racist attacks in poor neighbourhoods of Rabat. Describing the work of the association, which is based in one of the most violent neighbourhoods of Rabat, André explains, “We mobilise at the moment. In [the neighbourhood]³, you cannot stay calm. You need to be a lion to live there.” While still dreaming of going to Europe, he expects to get a residence permit in Morocco through the regularisation campaign, which is part of a broader new immigration policy in Morocco, initiated by the King in September 2013. André thinks that the residence permit would not only enable him to stay in Morocco legally but also to travel: “...if they regularise us, we can also get passports... it would allow us to travel in a good way.”

This article explains how the conditions of individual clandestine journeys to Europe and of settlement in Morocco have given rise to collective action to get legal status and rights in Morocco. Most of the research on pro-regularisation movements is based on Western countries that are seen as final destinations.⁴ The general assumption is that migrants such as André, given the “stigma of illegality” and their lack of democratic participation rights, would not invest in political struggle.⁵ Political mobilisation may even seem less likely in the inhospitable context of Morocco, where one might expect migrants without a legal status to remain invisible and/or to continue their journey into Europe. Conversely, this article shows that the governance of borders and immigration in Morocco, with its intention to curtail transit migration, has been conducive to political mobilisation by migrant and civil society actors.

Restrictions on mobility across borders and access to status and rights of non-citizens have been challenged from the grassroots.⁶ Additionally, migrants themselves have become part of these movements, despite the high risks involved.⁷ Studies have taken a political opportunity structure (POS) approach that prioritises the institutional environment to explain migrant collective action.⁸ Migrants with no legal status need more resources than citizens and immigrants with status to participate in social life and to mobilise and advocate for their rights.⁹ Undocumented migrants need the support of citizens to further their interests and to recognise political opportunities available to them and to provoke reactions from other actors in the field.¹⁰ Indeed, political mobilisation by migrants and pro-migrant activists go hand in hand, and one important component of mobilisation is the forging of “unexpected alliances that migration creates”.¹¹

The literature on the immigrant rights movement discusses reasons for mobilisation as well as its mechanisms in terms of repertoires of mobilisation, internal organisation of movements and coalitions made with other movements.¹² This article uses a similar analytical framework to existing research in the sense that I analyse the political environment, the actors giving support to the cause of irregular migrants and the discursive framework used by these actors. Taking into account the critique that POS approaches fall short in explaining the emergence of movements, the article underscores the importance of subjective experiences, as well as the “objective context” of migratory regimes, as a factor encouraging migrants to form collective associations.¹³ In this line, I suggest that the conditions of the journey and settlement in Morocco paved the way for the emergence of a pro-regularisation movement.

Given the burgeoning literature on migrants’ political mobilisation in general and pro-regularisation campaigns from the grassroots in particular, Morocco is certainly not a unique case where migrants without legal status have gained political voice. Nonetheless, it is the first country to engage in a regularisation scheme in the Northern African context identified with transit migration since the 1990s.¹⁴ The case of Morocco is particularly interesting to analyse because of the political implications of the term “transit migration” and what the term produces in terms of political mobilisation of migrants. Morocco, situated at the periphery of the EU, has been subjected to the externalisation of EU migration policies since the early 1990s. Such measures contribute to the immobilisation of migrants outside EU borders and have attracted growing critique and contestation by civil society and migrants.¹⁵ Taking a critical approach to the concept of “transit country” and to the idea that, countries at the periphery of the EU passively respond to the external pressure to control irregular migration, this article analyses the impact of the conditions of the journey and of settlement on the emergence of mobilisation for the rights of irregular migrants, in the case of Morocco.

The analysis relies on qualitative data collected over five visits to Morocco: three between April and October 2012, and two shorter follow-up visits in March and May 2014. I interviewed key stakeholders. Interviewees included high-level bureaucrats and state officials in six key state departments dealing with issues of emigration and immigration, and representatives from sixteen civil society organisations (CSOs), including migrant associations. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with thirty-six migrants (fifteen women and twenty-one men). Interviews were conducted either in English or French, and lasted between thirty minutes and two hours. The majority of migrants interviewed were from African countries such as Senegal, Guinea, Cameroon, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As selection criteria, I made sure that migrants interviewed would constitute a diverse group in terms of legal status and aspirations to go to Europe.

Interviews with stakeholders and migrants took place in urban centres hosting a considerable immigrant population: especially Rabat, but also Casablanca, Tangier, and Oujda. Observations were also made in public meetings and through daily encounters and casual conversations with migrants and CSO representatives. The analysis in this paper focuses on the perspectives of civil society actors and of migrants who are members, beneficiaries, voluntary or paid workers of these organisations. Related policy documents, reports and press releases are also included in the analysis.

The paper is organised in five sections. The first section gives an overview of the context of migratory regime in Morocco in relation to EU border regime and border infrastructure. Examining the impact of changing border infrastructure on migrant experiences of illegality, the second section suggests that the physical conditions of the EU borders have indirectly played a role in the mobilisation of demands by turning clandestine migratory routes into places of de facto settlement. In the third section, I examine how migrant associations increased their political clout through close alliances with national, international, and transnational organisations interested in the area of irregular migration in Morocco. The fourth section argues that such alliances were strengthened when claims were framed within the context of political liberalisation, African identity, and the emigration experience of Morocco. The last part of the article briefly explores policy outcomes this politicisation journey has given rise to, as well as the ongoing concerns over the future.

A Transit Country? Morocco and its Migratory Regime

After the 1990s, irregular border crossings through peripheral countries, labelled as transit countries, became a major concern for the EU.¹⁶ Policymakers and researchers in the field of migration began to focus on border policing and on clandestine crossings in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.¹⁷ As a result, throughout the 1990s, tensions related to irregular migration were common in Morocco's relations to Spain and the EU. To prevent illegal entries, the Spanish government started to build fences and walls around Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves on the African continent, in 1993. According to Zapata-Barrero and Witte, this was the first step towards the securitisation of the Spanish southern borders as a whole.¹⁸ Law 02-03, the Law regarding Entry and Residence of Foreigners in the Kingdom of Morocco and Irregular Emigration and Immigration, was enacted in 2003 to improve tense relations with the EU. As the name suggests, the law concerns irregular border crossings by Moroccans as well as irregular entry, stay and exit by third country nationals but contains few provisions regarding the human rights of migrants. In September and October 2005, the deaths of at least eleven sub-Saharan migrants and

hundreds of wounded migrants during their attempt to cross the land border between Morocco and Ceuta and Melilla demonstrated the human cost of coercive measures.¹⁹

While statistics and official data on immigration into Morocco are far from complete, previous estimates of the number of sub-Saharan irregular migrants in Morocco, between 2000 and 2010 ranged from 10,000 to 20,000.²⁰ In contrast, illegal entries into the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla did not exceed 2,000 per year until 2012.²¹ In 2013, over 4,300 people entered the enclaves through clandestine means.²² Despite this increase,²³ the number is still much less than the estimated number of clandestine migrants within Morocco. The discrepancy between those entering the Spanish enclaves and those remaining in Morocco without status indicates that Morocco has become a land of (forced) settlement for thousands deceived on their way to Europe, along with those who arrive in Morocco to work or study. Nonetheless, the label “transit country” obscures the fact that Morocco has become a land of destination for different migrant groups who have crossed borders to look for opportunities to work, study and/or settle in relatively more developed countries in the region.²⁴ In the urban setting, so-called *transit migrants* mingle with other migrant groups, including migrants with legal status, asylum seekers, recognised refugees, overstayers and undocumented migrants with no intention to cross. In this sense, it is difficult to distinguish migrants by their (alleged) aspirations to go to Europe based on their legal status.

Until 2013, official discourse that portrayed Morocco as a transit country and maintained that migrants in Morocco did not want to remain underpinned their exclusion from rights and membership. The country has been widely criticised for its security-oriented approach to migration, for undermining the rights of migrants and refugees at borders and within Morocco, and for not implementing the 1951 Geneva Convention to protect refugees and asylum seekers.²⁵ As a partial response to growing international and internal critiques regarding the treatment of migrants, the government under the leadership of the King Mohammed VI launched a new migratory policy in November 2013, a few months after signing the Mobility Partnership Agreement with the EU.²⁶ The new policy aims to regularise the status of irregular migrants residing in Morocco and improve their access to rights. Officials have emphasised that the new policy adopts a humanitarian approach to immigration, which respects international norms and the human rights of migrants. This indicated a significant shift from previous official discourse, which emphasised that Morocco lacked resources to deal with immigrants who were allegedly stuck in the country on their way to Europe.

Most analyses locate this recent turn in Morocco’s migration policy as part of the country’s geopolitical strategy to forge firmer relationships with

African countries and with the EU.²⁷ The involvement of civil society actors as stakeholders in this process has been relatively overlooked. Among these stakeholders, sub-Saharan migrant associations have been important actors, even though they are not legally recognised, and have demanded regularisation and the recognition of irregular migrant rights in Morocco. The new policy initiative has increased the visibility of migrants as representatives of migrant associations have been partially included in policy talks and public debates.²⁸ Even before the launch of the new policy, migrant associations had gradually become visible in street protests and vocal through press releases and media appearances, despite the criminalisation of their presence and the inhospitable social and economic context in Morocco.²⁹ To explain this process, one needs to analyse factors that led irregular migrants to seek recognition in Morocco and those that enabled them to make their voices heard.

Lived Experience of Journey and Settlement

Migrant experiences of journeys are often characterised by longer periods of waiting and/or by settlement/semi-settlement than initially planned by migrants undertaking clandestine journeys. Existing research has revealed long, fragmented and dangerous migrant journeys through Morocco, coercive border practices, poor living conditions, lack of access to fundamental rights and deportation practices of the Moroccan state.³⁰ These journeys have become politicised by different actors including the EU, the Moroccan government as well as migrants themselves. Along with the objective context criminalising irregular migration, migrants' subjective experiences of suffering underpinned how migrant journeys have become political journeys. In other words, the journey to and through Morocco, as well as settlement within Morocco, is often characterised by strict controls, harsh living conditions, and violent practices, which have sowed the seeds for migrant mobilisation.

A considerable number of migrants with no passports, who flee dire economic and political conditions in their country of origin, enter Morocco from Algeria with the aid of human smugglers.³¹ Violence is a common experience during the journey for migrants arriving in Morocco via this land route. Reports and research reveal that beatings, robbery and rape by smugglers and bandits start before migrants reach Morocco.³² Most migrants thus arrive physically and psychologically exhausted after long journeys that may take between several months and several years depending on one's resources. Oujda, the Moroccan city situated at the Algerian border, is the main entry point, especially for those who enter without passports. From Oujda, those with financial and social capital immediately look for ways to leave for Europe. Others look for opportunities to move to urban centres such as

Rabat, Casablanca, and Tangier,³³ where, according to previous research, they often remain for two to three years to collect money to move forward to Europe.³⁴ Migrants usually hide in ad hoc camps in the forests on the outskirts of Tangier and Nador while trying to cross European borders without documents.

Migrants and CSOs operating in the field emphasise that migrants have limited mobility after arriving in Oujda as the authorities closely control the city centre and its surroundings. Police regularly monitor the informal settlements in the forest between Oujda and the border, where they have carried out raids, destroying the informal camps, arresting some migrants and pushing others back to the Algerian border. Along with the coercive practice of removal to the border, foreigners face another barrier as they are not allowed to leave the city by train or bus without legal papers.³⁵ As these migrants crossed the border without legal entry, they do not have the necessary papers and are thus denied authorised access to other parts of the country. Sarah is from the Central African Republic and is in her early thirties. She left her husband and two children ten years ago and has since been travelling alone. She arrived in Oujda after a long journey through Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, and Algeria with the intention of crossing to Spain. After entering Morocco in early 2012, Sarah needed false papers to move to Rabat, then to the Morocco-Spain borderland:

As there are controls, you need to have papers. There are people providing fake identities to allow you to get out. The cost depends on the individual: some people pay 500 Dirham (MAD)³⁶, others 1000 MAD. These people will also buy you tickets for bus, train etc. Like this, they put us in a train and we came here. Then, I left to the forest to attempt the journey. We were settled in the forest. After, we attempted, attempted, we were drowned in the water, with small zodiacs. We were stopped. We were sent back. You sleep in the camps. Men go to search for water, the food... We were in a group. Men and women were sleeping in different areas. Some people were going to the city to search for food. It was a long walk, sometimes in the dark. Sometimes you find tomatoes, not in good condition. Then, we go to "attack". We call this "attack". How many people? It depends on the zodiac, if it is small, 15 people.

In parallel with the increasing number of migrants attempting to cross into Europe via Morocco since 2011, there has been an escalation in violence by Moroccan and Spanish border guards especially around Ceuta and Melilla, which has been denounced by CSOs.³⁷ Reports also underscore sexual violence committed by different actors including smugglers and other migrants.³⁸ When I met Sarah in May 2014, she was expecting a baby as a result of an unwanted pregnancy. She was advised to go back to Rabat and apply for asylum. "I was in Nador," she explained, "We tried, it did not work. Then, I was raped. There was pregnancy. There was a brother there, with his wife. Together, we came here." Sarah and André's narratives reveal strict

controls, harsh living conditions, and violent practices along the EU border. These factors may cause even the most determined migrants to change their minds and remain in Morocco rather than attempt the journey to Europe.

The living conditions in urban centres provide another layer to migrants' marginalisation pushing them to collective action. Migrants without a legal status and without financial means do not have access to proper housing. They resort to finding shelter in poor neighbourhoods known for widespread violence.³⁹ There, migrants have become targets of aggression and robbery. Sunny, a 38-year-old Nigerian, expressed his grievances as he revealed the knife scar on his arm: "Big knife. He did not ask anything. He had a problem. It is because I am black. If you go to office [a meeting place for Igbo men], many people have injuries like that." André echoed this experience, "These are young Moroccans, 18-25 years old. When they smoke weed and they see you in a corner, they say 'mobile phone and money', take out the knife." Fearing deportation, most migrants subjected to such aggression and violence are reluctant to go to police. Some even refrain from going to hospital, knowing that they may not be admitted or will have to pay high fees in private clinics.

Towards a Political Journey

The conditions of the clandestine journey to Europe and the lack of protection in Morocco encouraged migrants to mobilise among themselves and subsequently provided the basis for collaboration with other actors in Morocco and beyond.⁴⁰ An unprecedented mobilisation for the rights of irregular migrants emerged in Morocco in the wake of the Ceuta and Melilla scandal where Moroccan and Spanish border guards shot and killed migrants in 2005.⁴¹ Grievances stemming from the violence at the border and from the conditions of forced settlement have provided fertile ground for migrant mobilisation. In parallel, international and Moroccan CSOs advocating for the rights of immigrants and providing humanitarian support have proliferated. In this context of increasing awareness and interests, migrant organisations gained visibility through close alliances with simultaneously emerging Moroccan and international organisations focusing on immigration issues in Morocco.

The Council of Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco (CMSM) was established in the aftermath of the Ceuta and Melilla events of 2005 and represents migrants across ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences. Other sub-Saharan migrant associations, such as the Collective of Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco (founded in 2010) and ALECMA (founded in 2012), were formed later. The prevalent violence in their everyday lives in Morocco motivated migrants to establish these institutions as platforms to denounce such violence. Outing themselves in public to declare the legitimacy of their

presence⁴² has been one of the initial forms of mobilisation, as articulated by the informant from ALECMA:

There are many sub-Saharan living in Takadoum,⁴³ it is the hottest neighbourhood in Rabat. This [the neighbourhood violence] motivated us, sub-Saharan to come together to create an association, ALECMA. This is to denounce different problems we encounter in the country, then to defend our rights because as migrants, our rights need to be respected. This is why we regrouped under an association. We started this fight to be recognised.... This is related to different aggressions. In August 2012, there was a series of aggressions. In one week, there were six cases. This is why we called all sub-Saharan living in Takadoum and we made a pacific march. We wanted to be heard. We made a march to the police station because a sub-Saharan was seriously injured because of aggression. We made the march with the injured to the police station. We passed by consulates, Mali, Ivory Coast, Central Africa. After this march, we had the idea of getting together under an association.

Activist migrants refer to previous activism and their lived experiences in Morocco as the main motivations to initiate or join migrant organisations. Oumar from Guinea, an active member of CMSM, narrates his mobilisation story resulting partly from his activist background but also from his experience since arrival in Morocco:

I was in an association in my country. After coming here, I went through a new formation. There was need to revolt. In 2005, I was in the heart of the events. This gave a breath to my engagement. It was part of the motor of my engagement.

Moussa, also from Guinea, started to get involved in migrant organisations in 2009, years after he arrived in Morocco with the intention to continue to Europe in early 2000s. He explains his own and other sub-Saharan migrants' involvement with associations as a result of gradual awareness and as a reaction to racist discrimination they face in daily life:

This is the communication. We are mobilising people to rise for their rights. You should not stay in your house hidden, you need to go out and ask for your rights. You have the right of workers, right to papers, right to access to health, right to liberty. You should not stay in your corner. You need to claim your rights. This is what the Council [CMSM] is trying to do.

In parallel with informal migrant organisations, formal organisations working on irregular migration issues have emerged and proliferated thanks to political and institutional changes in the country. Morocco has undergone a liberalisation process with regard to civil society since the early 1990s.⁴⁴ In 1990, the government established the Consultative Council of Human Rights (CCDH), appointed by the King Hassan II to mediate between state and civil society.⁴⁵ This liberalisation process continued under the reign of Mohammed VI since 1999. The 2011 Constitution, introduced in the aftermath of street protests during the Arab Spring, included articles on the

human rights of foreigners and recognised the role of civil society's contributions to public policy.⁴⁶ The National Council of Human Rights (CNDH) replaced CCDH and was given more independence in the 2011 Constitution.⁴⁷ Despite criticism that it is a state agency with closed membership and a lack of independence,⁴⁸ CNDH has been a crucial channel for the lobbying efforts of civil society, including the demand for regularisation of irregular migrants. In this period, more funding opportunities have become available for CSOs working on irregular migration issues in Morocco. These new sources of funding come from the EU especially, but also from other international funders.⁴⁹

Civil society has worked towards highlighting the responsibility of the EU and the Moroccan state for the abuses and vulnerable situation of irregular migrants in Morocco. Among civil society actors active in the field, there are international organisations, national human rights and labour organisations, and organisations operating on a local level. In terms of their main activities, humanitarian aid is a priority for some institutions, while others are more concerned with rights advocacy and awareness raising.⁵⁰ The democratic developments engendered favourable conditions for raising demands and critiques regarding rights violations of immigrants in Morocco, unlike other countries in the North African context where the treatment of migrants has been equally problematic.⁵¹ Meanwhile, tensions have prevailed between the Moroccan government and CSOs. For instance, the Antiracist Group of Support and Defense of Foreigners and Migrants (GADEM) was founded in December 2006 in the aftermath of Ceuta and Melilla events to defend migrants' rights, but was not recognised by the state until November 2013 under the new migration policy.

The emergence of international and Moroccan organisations working on irregular migration has provided an opportunity for migrant organisations to set their agenda and raise their claims. Many amongst the founders of migrant associations joined the formation of "Asile Maroc", jointly organised by Cimade, a French organisation, and AFVIC, a Moroccan one, in collaboration with the UNHCR in 2006. The aim of new organisations was to raise awareness on the question of asylum and irregular migration.⁵² In this sense, interactions between migrant activists and Moroccan or international associations were strong since the beginning of the mobilisation process. As sub-Saharan migrant associations became more established, increased in number, and collaborated more frequently with Moroccan and transnational civil society actors, they amplified their visibility and their demands for the fundamental rights of migrants, the regularisation of undocumented migrants, and the formal recognition of their associations. The wide use of the French language amongst middle-class Moroccans and sub-Saharan migrants facilitated communication between associations as well as amongst migrant communities themselves.⁵³

The relationship between Moroccan and migrant groups is mutually beneficial and both indicate that they need each other to further their agendas. For example, migrant organisations are better able to reach vulnerable migrant populations. Moroccan organisations doing research or humanitarian work in the field sometimes hire migrants (regardless of status) on a voluntary or occasionally paid basis as “proximity agents”. Many of the informants, including leaders and members of migrant associations, had previously worked for Moroccan or international organisations in order to identify the needs of different communities and to collect data.⁵⁴ Moroccan, international and migrant organisations also collaborated in collecting data on cases of violence along the Moroccan-Spanish border and denouncing aggressions. They worked towards humanising migrants by revealing their personal stories and the “punitive realities of border and migration controls”.⁵⁵

While the discourse that migrants should be able to speak for themselves is widespread among migrant activists, the majority of migrant association members do not have legal status. Similarly, most associations are not formally recognised. Members of migrant associations therefore maintain that they need Moroccan CSOs to carry out public protests. For example, Moroccan CSOs can secure legal permission to hold public protests.⁵⁶ They have also been instrumental in securing the participation of undocumented migrants in public events and providing some protection for these participants. In 2012, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) helped to transport migrants from Rabat to Oujda to participate in the Social Forum on Immigration.⁵⁷ Before the forum, Moroccan organisations negotiated with the Moroccan authorities in order to ensure the safe participation of migrants without legal status. Having participated in the Forum, André recounted how he felt empowered and protected from the police due to the support and presence of Moroccan CSOs.

The unionisation of migrant workers has also become part of the mobilisation process in Morocco. The Democratic Organisations of Workers (ODT) was the first and, as of 2014, the only union to accept migrants (with or without legal status) as members. The expansion of trade union membership to include the (undocumented) migrant labour force strengthened demands for regularisation. The first step towards the unionisation of migrants was taken on Labour Day in 2012 when CMSM, the Council of Migrants, in collaboration with the ODT, organised a public protest with the motto “We love Morocco, we work in Morocco, regularise us”.⁵⁸ The admission of migrant workers into the union under its new branch ODT Immigrant Workers (ODT-IT) was officially launched during the ODT Congress in July 2012, with the participation of hundreds of migrants.⁵⁹ CMSM played an active role in the coordination between migrant

communities and unionists together with Marcel Amiyeto,⁶⁰ a recognised refugee, who has worked in several migrant organisations.

Alliances with national and transnational actors as well as with public institutions increased the visibility of migrant associations and their demands. The foundation of ODT-IT was a concrete example of a successful alliance between Moroccan civil society and migrant associations and an important step towards regularisation. In the process of unionisation, ODT-IT, along with other migrant organisations in Morocco, forged a transnational alliance with the Association of Maghrebian Workers in France (ATMF).⁶¹ Amiyeto's narrative underscores the role played by transnational alliances in the process of unionisation: "Members of ATMF encouraged us. We made contacts with ODT and started to reflect on the question and how to make foreign workers members of the union. Before, the internal rules of the union were not allowing the membership of foreigners." Later, the CNDH and the Council for Moroccans Abroad (CCME),⁶² another semi-public institution with a transnational character, supported the ODT-IT and its demands for the regularisation of migrants without legal status in Morocco.

Embracing this link between the immigration and emigration histories of Morocco,⁶³ CCME in collaboration with CNDH⁶⁴ have played a critical role in the initiation of a new immigration policy in Morocco. CCME conducted research in collaboration with the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a UK-based think-tank, on the precarious situation of sub-Saharan irregular migrants in Morocco.⁶⁵ As explained below, based on the findings of research they conducted in Eastern and Northern parts of the country, CNDH wrote a detailed report and presented recommendations for the new policy.⁶⁶ These recommendations included the regularisation of undocumented migrants in Morocco. Migrants used their limited institutional capacity to reach institutions, such as CNDH, who had the capacity to advocate for changes in immigration policy.

Framing Mobilisation

The framing process is defined as the "conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action".⁶⁷ Such framing shapes the ideational dimensions of collective action. Below, I analyse common references made by Moroccan CSOs and migrant associations alike to the rule of law, the ongoing democratisation process in Morocco, and the country's emigration experience. These principles provided fertile ground to raise awareness of human rights violations against irregular migrants and to demand regularisation.

Pro-regularisation actors argued that Morocco has become a receiving country rather than a space of transit and thus problematised the notion of transit. They argued that the changing patterns in mobility made the Moroccan government responsible for the situation of immigrants regardless of their intention to travel to Spain: “With AMDH and other associations, we insist on regularisation. Some say it is an EU problem, not Moroccan; the EU wants us to regularise people but they do not want to open their borders. We say it is also a Moroccan problem.”⁶⁸ The security-oriented approach in government legislation and implementation was also criticised. CSOs such as AMDH and GADEM underscored the importance of the rule of law in asking for protective measures in existing legislation to be upheld. For example, CSOs forcefully criticised and fought against the removal of minors, asylum seekers, and pregnant women despite protective measures in national law.⁶⁹ Furthermore, they demanded more migrant rights in accordance with the principles endorsed in the 2011 Constitution, universal human rights, and international law. Associations underscored, in press releases and public meetings, Morocco’s responsibilities as a signatory to the 1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and to other international conventions.⁷⁰

Interestingly, representatives of migrant organisations also employed this language of rights and situate themselves as progressive actors in this democratisation process of the country. An executive member of the CMSM, the Migrant Council, underscored that Morocco is the first Maghreb country to see the establishment of migrant associations and that their presence is a positive development rather than a threat for the future of the country:

We are doing sit-in protests. We are on TV. They think that we are here to sabotage Morocco when we criticise state. Not really.... We are not a threat to Morocco, we are a chance for the country. In terms of associations like us, in terms of migrants’ communities being together to defend rights, Morocco is the first among all countries in the Maghreb. Honestly, *it is a chance for Morocco to respect democratic rights.*⁷¹

Along with responsibilities arising from international legal norms, common references to a shared African identity and a shared emigration experience between sub-Saharan and Moroccans have underpinned alliances. In public statements, pro-migrant rights actors display solidarity with “African brothers” with references to Morocco’s African identity.⁷² Similarly, King Mohammed VI underscored Morocco’s African identity in his royal speech announcing the new approach to immigration policy.⁷³ References made to the emigration experience of Morocco served as another ideational ground for mobilisation. After years of work on discrimination against Moroccan migrants in Europe, AMDH, a human rights organisation working nationally and internationally, reflected on the changing migration situation in the

country. The informant explained their interest in immigration issues and collaboration with migrant associations was prompted by empathy due to the Moroccan emigration experience: “We suffered from racism and we are racist against migrants”.

Using emigration as a reference point has provided ground for transnational and at times “unexpected alliances”.⁷⁴ As mentioned, ATMF, the Association of Maghrebian Workers in France, supported the unionisation activities of migrants in Morocco. In November 2011, Ali El Baz, the national coordinator of ATMF, called on civil society to support sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco as an extension of their own cause for the rights of Moroccan migrants in France and elsewhere. He declared: “We do not comprehend claiming regularisation for hundreds of thousands of Moroccans abroad while Morocco will not even do it for a few thousand sub-Saharan immigrants.”⁷⁵ As in the case of AMDH, ATMF’s solidarity with migrants in Morocco emerges from the experience of Moroccans with an irregular status in Europe: “It reminds us of our situation in the 1970s. It is natural that we react to this. It is normal. This is why we play the role of advocates.”⁷⁶ Empowered by such support, migrant associations also used references to Moroccan emigration to further their demands. In the aftermath of the World Social Forum held in Dakar in November 2011, the former president of the Collective of Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco, said: “We want to be given the same rights as Moroccans living abroad in their host countries.”⁷⁷

Regularisation Campaign and Ongoing Mobilisation

In response to the continued human rights violations of immigrants in Morocco, the above-mentioned report prepared by CNDH was presented to the King in September 2013 and called for a radical shift in the country’s migration policies. While the report was not publicly accessible, the CNDH proposed a policy initiative to facilitate the legal and socio-economic integration of both asylum seekers and migrants including the regularisation of certain groups of migrants based on criteria such as duration of stay, principles of family unity, and conditions of integration.⁷⁸ King Mohammed VI, in a communiqué from the royal cabinet, recognised the human rights of migrants in Morocco as “legitimate preoccupations” and was quick to chair a meeting with members of the government to devise a new comprehensive migration policy.⁷⁹ Following the initiative of the King, the government announced a regularisation campaign in November 2013.⁸⁰ The launch of the new policy led to preparations for new legislation concerning asylum, migrant integration, human trafficking, and regularisation, as well as changes in the implementation of current legislation. The mandate of the Ministry Responsible for Moroccans Abroad was expanded to include

immigration as well as emigration issues. The ministry was renamed the *Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs*. Foreigners' Offices have been created to operationalise the regularisation programme. Moreover, an ad hoc commission started to prepare a national asylum law and the dormant asylum bureau re-opened in Rabat to coordinate with the UNHCR in processing asylum cases. Civil society organisations active in the field of immigration and human rights were invited to contribute to the process of drafting the new Moroccan immigration policy.⁸¹ As previously stated, the new policy initiative increased the visibility of migrant and pro-migrant activists in policy circles and the public sphere, and offered them a platform to raise their concerns.

While the new regularisation policy provides hope for the future, it has also raised some concerns. High eligibility requirements and the uncertainty faced by those whose applications are rejected are the most criticised aspects of the regularisation campaign. As a partial response, authorities loosened criteria for regularisation to include women, minors and Syrian refugees as vulnerable groups, as well as activists and leaders of informal migrant associations. By the end of the regularisation programme in December 2014, 27,332 migrants with an irregular status applied for the regularisation scheme and 17,916 were regularised.⁸² CSOs are also concerned about the future use of personal information for other purposes such as readmission of migrants apprehended after crossing into Europe.⁸³ Moreover, the continuation of violent deportation practices and suspicious migrant deaths during police interventions fuelled scepticism about the real impact of the new policy for migrant livelihoods.⁸⁴ Despite the departure from the previous approach that criminalised the presence of migrants on Moroccan territory, securitised measures continue, especially at the border. For instance, removal practices, which have led to severe injuries and deaths especially along the border, continued throughout 2014, and after the end of the regularisation programme.⁸⁵ Because of relative empowerment and concerns over ongoing practices, migrant mobilisations have gained further momentum in the aftermath of the reform initiative. Moroccan and migrant organisations continue to organise public protests against rights violations, racist crimes, and attitudes towards migrants.⁸⁶

Conclusion

Migrants are not only victims of external conditions but also active subjects even in contexts characterised by violent practices. They consciously endeavour to improve their living conditions within the political, social, and institutional constraints and opportunities surrounding them. Given this premise, the article has analysed the political, institutional and discursive contexts that made the political mobilisation of irregular migrants a viable option, even for some migrants allegedly pursuing a trans-Saharan journey

through Morocco to Europe. I have shown that migrants with an irregular status in Morocco, animated by their experience of marginalisation, have been able to carve out political space to claim rights and legal status thanks to alliances with Moroccan and international organisations. In response to different types of exclusionary practices and human rights violations, migrants in Morocco formed solidarity associations. The Ceuta and Melilla events, forming the “transition moments in migrants’ engagements”,⁸⁷ pushed existing solidarity networks to become political organisations.

The focus on migrant mobilisation in the case of Morocco has revealed the impact of lived experience and of (at times unusual) alliances between migrants and civil society actors on the emergence and relative success of a pro-regularisation movement. Experiences of being stranded and of exclusion pushing migrants towards collective action and the support by Moroccan and international CSOs have been distinguishing aspects of migrant mobilisation in Morocco. As sub-Saharan migrant associations became more established and collaborated more frequently with Moroccan and transnational civil society actors, they amplified their visibility and their demands for the fundamental rights of migrants, the regularisation of undocumented migrants and the formal recognition of their associations. The use of a referential framework based on a language of rights, a common African identity, and a common experience of migration reinforced the shared ideological ground of such alliances. Because of this mobilisation, migrants with an irregular status became visible in the public sphere, before state authorities recognised their presence.

Whether the new Moroccan policy, welcomed by the international community, will meet the expectations of pro-migrant activists is still questionable. The continuation of violence inflicted on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa along the Moroccan-Spanish border but also within Morocco casts doubt on whether immigrants will be given a genuine voice in the migration policy-making process and whether they will be considered full members of Moroccan society in the near future.⁸⁸ While acknowledging these concerns, I argue that the policy change in Morocco cannot only be explained through the strategic interests of Morocco vis-à-vis its northern and southern neighbours. Such an approach reifies the notion of transit country and characterises countries at the EU’s periphery as passive “victims” of their geographies. Rather, examining the political, social and institutional conditions within the receiving context better explains the production and implications of migrant illegality as an interaction between domestic socio-political factors and foreign policy. Therefore, a sociological and institutional approach to the process of de facto settlement provides a dynamic view of the transit context that enriches our understanding of migrant mobilisation and its potential impact on political change.⁸⁹

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Notes

1. All names used are pseudonyms unless indicated otherwise.
2. *Zodiac* is a known brand for rigid inflatable boats; the name is commonly used to refer to these types of boats.
3. He utters the name of one of the neighbourhoods in Rabat inhabited by migrants from sub-Saharan countries and known to be unsafe.
4. P. Nyers and K. Rygiel (eds.), *Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement* (London: Routledge 2012); I. Tyler and K. Marciak, ‘Immigrant Protest: An Introduction’, *Citizenship Studies* 17/2 (2013) pp. 143–156; W. J. Nicholls, ‘From Political Opportunities to Niche-Openings: The Dilemmas of Mobilizing for Immigrant Rights in Inhospitable Environments’, *Theory and Society* 43/1 (2014) pp. 23–49.
5. Nicholls (note 4); B. Laubenthal, ‘The Emergence of Pro-Regularization Movements in Western Europe’, *International Migration* 45/3 (2007) pp. 101–33.
6. Nyers and Rygiel (note 4) p. 7; Nicholls (note 4).
7. Nicholls (note 4) p. 24; C. Raissiguier, ‘Troubling Borders: *Sans Papiers* in France’, in H. Schwenken and S. Ruß-Sattar (eds.), *New Border and Citizenship Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2014) pp. 156–170.
8. D. Però, ‘Migrants’ Mobilization and Anthropology’, in D. Reed-Danahay and C. Brettell (eds.), *Citizenship, Political Engagement and Belonging: Immigrants in Europe and the United States* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 2008) p. 108; for a review of POS approaches in migrant mobilisation research, see D. Però, and J. Solomos, ‘Introduction: Migrant Politics and Mobilization: Exclusion, Engagements, Incorporation’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33/1 (2010) pp. 8–12.
9. M. Cvajner and G. Sciortino, ‘Theorizing Irregular Migration: The Control of Spatial Mobility in Differentiated Societies’, *European Journal of Social Theory* 13/3 (2010) pp. 389–404.
10. I. Breyer and S. Dumitru, ‘Les sans-papiers et leur droit d’avoir des droits’, *Raisons politiques* (2007) p. 138; Laubenthal (note 5) pp. 105–106; C. Bröer and J. W. Duyvendak, ‘Discursive

- Opportunities, Feeling Rules, and the Rise of Protests against Aircraft Noise', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 14/3 (2009) pp. 337–356.
11. S. B. Coutin, 'The Rights of Noncitizens in the United States', *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 7 (2011) p. 306.
 12. M. Chimienti, 'Mobilization of Irregular Migrants in Europe: A Comparative Analysis', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34/8 (2011) pp. 1338–1356.
 13. Laubenthal (note 5) p. 105; Chimienti (note 12) p. 1340; Però and Solomos (note 8).
 14. P. Fargues, 'Work, Refuge, Transit: An Emerging Pattern of Irregular Immigration South and East of the Mediterranean', *International Migration Review* 43/3 (2009) pp. 544–577.
 15. Tyler and Marciak (note 4) p. 149; X. Ferrer-Gallardo and A. Albet-Mas, 'EU-Limboscapes: Ceuta and the Proliferation of Migrant Detention Spaces across the European Union', *European Urban and Regional Studies* (2013) pp. 1–4.
 16. F. Duvell, 'Transit Migration: A Blurred and Politicised Concept', *Population, Space and Place* 18/4 (2012) pp. 415–427.
 17. D. Lutterbeck, 'Policing Migration in the Mediterranean', *Mediterranean Politics* 11/1 (2006) pp. 59–82; L. Bialasiewicz, 'Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of EUrope: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean', *Geopolitics* 17/4 (2012) pp. 843–866; S. Borg, 'Euro-Crafting at Border Zones: The Case of the Greco-Turkish Border and the Question of a European Union "Beyond the State"', *Geopolitics* 19/3 (2014) pp. 565–586.
 18. R. Zapata-Barrero and N. De Witte, 'The Spanish Governance of EU Borders: Normative Questions', *Mediterranean Politics* 12/1 (2007) p. 86.
 19. MIGREUROP, *Guerre aux migrants – Le livre noir de Ceuta et Melilla* (Paris: Migreurop 2006);
X. Ferrer-Gallardo and A. Planet-Contreras, 'Ceuta and Melilla: Euro-African Borderscapes', AGORA (2012) pp. 32–35.
 20. M. Khachani, 'La question migratoire au Maroc: Données récentes', CARIM *Analytic and Synthetic Notes* 2011/71, Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Migration: Recent Developments Series (2011) p. 4.
 21. APDHA, *Derechos Humanos en la Frontera Sur 2009* (Sevilla: APDHA 2010) p. 10, available at <<http://www.apdha.org/media/informeFS2009.pdf>>.
 22. APDHA, *Droits de l'homme à la frontière sud 2014* (Sevilla: APDHA 2014) p. 47, available at <http://www.apdha.org/media/frontiere_sud%202014.pdf>.
 23. According to UNHCR Spain, the increase was due to the increasing arrivals from countries torn by conflict such as Syria, Central Africa Republic, and Mali. See UNHCR, 'UNHCR Concerned over Attempt to Legalize Automatic Returns from Spanish Enclaves', *Briefing Notes*, 28 Oct. 2014, available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/544f71e96.html>>.
 24. M. Berriane, H. de Haas, and K. Natter, 'Introduction: Revisiting Moroccan Migrations', *The Journal of North African Studies* 20/4 (2015) pp. 513–514.
 25. MSF, *Violence, Vulnerability and Migration: Trapped at the Gates of Europe* (Geneva: MSF Report 2013);
HRW, *Abused and Expelled Ill-Treatment of Sub-Saharan African Migrants in Morocco* (New York: Human Rights Watch 2014).
 26. Morocco signed a Mobility Partnership Agreement with the EU and six EU member states in June 2013. Along with cooperation "to prevent and combat illegal migration", the partnership document envisages the EU's assistance for the introduction of a new asylum and international protection system in Morocco and for the improvement of a legal framework concerning various categories of migrants. Interestingly,

- the regularisation of irregular migrants was not part the envisaged changes mentioned in the documents.
27. M. Alioua ‘Régularisation des étrangers au Maroc: Analyse d'une décision historique mais surtout stratégique’, *yabiladi.com*, 15 Nov. 2013, available at <<http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/20944/regularisation-etrangers-maroc-analyse-d-une.html>>.
 28. Association members were invited and given voice in policy meetings such as ‘The new migration policy in Morocco, which strategy of integration?’ organised by Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Abroad and Migration Affairs, IOM, Confederation of Switzerland, 11–12 March 2014, Rabat, Morocco. See also, *yabiladi.com*, 7 March 2013, available at <<http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/23929/seminaire-international-l-integration-immigres-maroc.html>>; see also ‘Rencontre des migrants avec Anis Birou, ministre chargé de la question migratoire’, *TV5MONDE*, 20 Dec. 2013, available at <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e9MgXEeiGvg>>.
 29. See ‘Maroc une nouvelle politique migratoire face à la montée du racisme’, *TV5monde.com*, 17 Sep. 2013, available at <<http://www.tv5monde.com/cms/chaine-francophone/info/Les-dossiers-de-la-redaction/Maroc-2011/p-26268-Maroc-une-nouvelle-politique-migratoire-face-a-la-montee-du-racisme.htm>>; see also Joint Communication by GADEM and Council of Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco (CMSM), ‘Recrudescence de la répression envers les migrants au Maroc: Une violence qu'on croyait révolue’, Sep. 2012, available at <http://www.gadem-asso.org/IMG/pdf/2012_09_02-NoteCMSM_GADEM_pdf.pdf>.
 30. L. Barros, M. Lahlou, C. Escoffier, P. Pumares, and P. Ruspini, *L'immigration irrégulière subsaharienne à travers et vers le Maroc* (Geneva: ILO 2002); A. S. Wender, M. J. Laflamme-Marsan, H. G. Rachidi, and O. Bel Younes, *La situation alarmante des migrants sub-sahariens en transit au Maroc et les conséquences des politiques de l'Union Européenne* (Paris: Cimade 2004); M. Alioua, ‘La migration transnationale – logique individuelle dans l'espace national: l'exemple des transmigrants subsahariens à l'épreuve de l'externalisation de la gestion des flux migratoires au Maroc’, *Social Science Information* 47 (2008) pp. 697–713; AMERM, *De l'afrique subsaharien au Maroc: les realites de la migration irreguliere* (Rabat: AMERM 2008); M. Cherti and P. Grant, *The Myth of Transit: Sub-Saharan Migration in Morocco* (London: IPPR 2013).
 31. The land border between Algeria and Morocco has been officially closed since 1994 because of the conflict over Western Sahara.
 32. M. Collyer, ‘Stranded Migrants and the Fragmented Journey’, *Journal of Refugee Studies* 23 (2010) pp. 273–293; R. Andersson ‘Hunter and Prey: Patrolling Clandestine Migration in the Euro-African Borderlands’, *Anthropological Quarterly* 87/1 (2014) pp. 119–149; Cherti and Grant (note 30); MSF (note 25).
 33. According to CSOs based in Tangier, security forces pushed migrants out of Tangier in 2005 after Ceuta events. However, in the last couple of years, urban migrants started to settle there again.
 34. AMERM (note 30).
 35. The Oujda train station was the only place within the country where my identity was checked before buying a train ticket to Rabat.
 36. 500 MAD is approximately 56 USD.
 37. In March 2013, a filmmaker documented the death of a Cameroonian migrant after an “attack” in Gourougou forest outside of Melilla. The video, showing systemic violence at the European border of Morocco, gave rise to an international campaign to stop violence at the border. See S. Bachelet, ‘Morocco Trials a ‘Radically New’ Politics of Migration for Sub-Saharan Africans’, *AllAfrica.com*, 15 Jan. 2014, available

- at <<http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/15/morocco-trials-a-radically-new-politics-of-migration-for-sub-saharan-africans-by-sebastien-bachelet>>.
38. MSF (note 25) p. 23.
 39. Note that African students with legal papers also live in the same dangerous neighbourhoods because these are the only areas they can afford.
 40. See for instance, Joint Communication by GADEM and Council of Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco (note 29). See also the campaign "No. 9 – Stop Violence at the Borders!" initiated by ALECMA and Moroccan associations AMDH, GADEM FMAS (Le Forum des Alternatives Maroc), available at <<http://saracreta.wix.com/into-the-forest>>.
 41. Ferrer-Gallardo and Planet-Contreras (note 19) p. 33.
 42. A. McNevin, 'Undocumented Citizens? Shifting Grounds of Citizenship in Los Angeles', in P. Nyers and K. Rygiel (eds.) *Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement* (New York and London: Routledge 2012) p. 177.
 43. Takadoum is widely referred to in national and international news as an unsafe neighbourhood inhabited by migrants from sub-Saharan countries (see for instance, 'African Migrants in Morocco Tell of Abuse', *New York Times*, 28 Nov. 2012, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/world/middleeast/african-migrants-in-morocco-tell-of-abuse.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>).
 44. J. N. Sater, *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco* (New York: Routledge 2007) pp. 160–161.
 45. L. Storm, *Democratization in Morocco: The Political Elite and Struggles for Power in the Post-Independence State* (New York: Routledge 2010) p. 72.
 46. See Article 12 and 30 of the 2011 Constitution. See also R. Touhtou, 'Civil Society in Morocco under the New 2011 Constitution: Issues, Stakes and Challenges', *Research Paper, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies* (Sep. 2014) pp. 10–11.
 47. According to the Article 161 of the 2011 Constitution, CNDH is an independent, pluralist organisation in charge of promoting human rights.
 48. T. Raková, *Advocating Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in Morocco*, Diploma Thesis, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, 2014.
 49. B. Dimitrovova, 'Re-Shaping Civil Society in Morocco: Boundary Setting, Integration and Consolidation', *European Integration* 32 (2010) pp. 523–539. Also note that some organisations refused EU funding.
 50. For a comprehensive review of civil society activities with irregular migrants in Morocco, see A. Jacobs, *Sub-Saharan Irregular Migration in Morocco; The Politics of Civil Society and the State in the Struggle for Migrants' Rights*, Fulbright Morocco, Sep. 2011–Aug. 2012.
 51. M. Cherti and M. Collyer, 'Immigration and Pensée d'Etat: Moroccan Migration Policy Changes as Transformation of "geopolitical culture"', *The Journal of North African Studies* 20/4 (2015) p. 591.
 52. M. Alioua, 'Le "passage au politique" des transmigrants subsahariens au Maroc', in A. Bensaâd (ed.), *Le Maghreb à l'épreuve des migrations subsahariennes. Immigration sur émigration* (Paris: Karthala 2009) pp. 293–294.
 53. Meanwhile, English-speaking migrant communities have difficulties accessing these networks.
 54. While this may provide an economic opportunity for a very small minority of migrants, these relations are not free from tension. Some informants believed they were exploited by CSOs and not sufficiently compensated despite available funds.
 55. Tyler and Marciak (note 4) p. 152.
 56. Jacobs (note 50) p. 72.

57. The road between Oujda and Rabat is highly controlled as most migrants entering Oujda attempt to get to Rabat using the same route.
58. See ‘1er Mai 2012: lancement de la campagne de régularisation des sans papiers(e) au Maroc’, *Atmf.org*, 3 May 2012, available at <http://atmf.org/1er-Mai-2012-lancement-de-la_1538>.
59. ‘L’ODT ouvre ses portes aux travailleurs immigrés’, *L’économiste*, 3 July 2012, available at <<http://www.leconomiste.com/article/896170-l-odt-ouvre-ses-portes-aux-travailleurs-immigr-s>>.
60. I employ his real name as he is a well-known figure.
61. ATMF has been one of the major actors in mobilisation of irregular migrants in France.
62. CCME was established in 2007 and was subsequently recognised in the 2011 Constitution. The Council consists of representatives from the Moroccan community abroad, mostly appointed by the King.
63. For a detailed analysis of the impact of emigration policies and institutions on immigration in Morocco, see A. Ustubici, ‘Dynamics in Emigration and Immigration Policies of Morocco: A Double Engagement’, *Migration and Development* 4/2 (2015) pp. 238–255.
64. Both institutions are led by Driss El Yazami, a well-known human rights activist in Morocco.
65. The outcome of this research has been published by IPPR; see Cherti and Grant (note 30).
66. ‘Notre société doit faire preuve de générosité’, *Telquel* 1038 (13–19 Sep. 2013) p. 16; CNDH, *Conclusions et recommandations du rapport: Etrangers et droits de l’homme au Maroc: pour une politique d’asile et d’immigration radicalement nouvelle* (Rabat: CNDH 2013).
67. D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) p. 6.
68. Interview with ATMF, September 2012.
69. See Article 26 of the Law no:02-03, *The Law Regarding Entry and Residence of Foreigners in the Kingdom of Morocco and Irregular Emigration and Immigration*.
70. Morocco, as an emigration country, was one of the first countries to sign the 1990 Convention. During the 2000s, the document served as a reference to criticise the treatment of immigrants in Morocco. For instance, GADEM (2013) prepared a report on the implementation of the 1990 Convention and implications for the rights of immigrants in Morocco in collaboration with migrant associations as well as other Moroccan associations (see GADEM et al., 2013; cf. AMDH, ‘Situation of Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco between International Commitments and Reality’, *AMDH Oujda*, Sep. 2012); CMSM, ‘Report on Recent Violations of Rights of Immigrants in Morocco’, 25 March 2013, Rabat.
71. Interview with CMSM informant, 2, September 2012 (emphasis added).
72. ‘Non aux violations flagrantes des droits et dignités des frères sub-sahariens au Maroc’, *atmf.org*, 26 April 2012, available at <<http://atmf.org/Non-aux-violations-flagrantes-des>>.
73. See for instance, Royal discourse in the occasion of 38th Anniversary of the Green March, 6 Nov. 2013, available at <<http://www.map.co.ma/fr/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-discours-la-nation-l%E2%80%99occasion-du-38eme-anniversaire>>.
74. Coutin (note 11) p. 302.

75. ‘Les Subsahariens au Maroc réclament leurs droits’, *yabiladi.com*, 11 Nov. 2011, available at <<http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/7384/subsahariens-maroc-reclament-leurs-droits.html>>.
76. Interview with ATMF, September 2012.
77. ‘Les Subsahariens’ (note 75).
78. CNDH (note 66).
79. ‘Migration: Royal Instructions Bring a New Vision for a National and Humanist Migration Policy (Release)’, *maroc.ma*, 12 Sep. 2012, available at <<http://www.maroc.ma/en/news/migration-royal-instructions-bring-new-vision-national-and-humanist-migration-policy-release>>.
80. “The exceptional operation of regularization concerns foreigners with spouses from Moroccan nationality living together for at least two years; foreigners with foreign spouses residing legally in Morocco and living together for at least four years; children from the two previous cases; foreigners with employment contracts effective for at least two years; foreigners justifying five years of continuous residence in Morocco, and foreigners with serious illnesses who had arrived the country before December 31 2013.” See ‘Le Maroc lance du 1er janvier au 31 décembre 2014 une opération exceptionnelle de régularisation des étrangers en situation irrégulière’, *marocainsdumonde.gov.ma*, 13 Nov. 2013, available at <<http://www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/actions-du-minist%C3%A8re/le-maroc-lance-du-1er-janvier-au-31-d%C3%A9cembre-2014-une-op%C3%A9ration-exceptionnelle-de-r%C3%A9gularisation-des-%C3%A9trangers-en-situation-irr%C3%A9gul%C3%A8re.aspx>>.
81. UNHCR and IOM noted increased cooperation between civil society actors and the Ministry of Migration Affairs in follow-up interviews conducted in May 2014.
82. I. Martin, ‘Ten Years Afterwards, Is Morocco an Immigration Trailblazer Again?’, *Migration Policy Center Blog* 25 Feb. 2015, available at <<https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/ten-years-afterwards-is-morocco-an-immigration-trailblazer-again/>>.
83. J. Chaudier, ‘Régularisation des migrants au Maroc: Un moratoire sur les expulsions demandé par les associations’, *yabiladi.com*, 27 Nov. 2013, available at <<http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/21232/regularization-migrants-maroc-moratoire-expulsions.html>>.
84. Ibid. See also Bachelet (note 37).
85. A. Belghazi, ‘La GADEM devoile la liste des lieux de detention des migrants au Maroc’, 19 Feb. 2015, available at <<http://www.medias24.com/SOCIETE/152908-Le-Gadem-devoile-la-liste-des-lieux-de-detention-des-migrants-au-Maroc.html#sthash.cM7mFIU5.gbpl>>.
86. ‘Manifestation contre le racisme à Rabat’, *yabiladi.com*, 12 Sep. 2014, available at <<http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/29402/manifestation-contre-racisme-rabat>>.
87. Però and Solomos (note 8) p. 11.
88. ‘Immigration le double discours’, *Telquel* 634 (11 Sep. 2014), available at <http://telquel.ma/2014/09/11/en-kiosque-numero-634-telquel_1415869>.
89. M. Collyer and H. de Haas, ‘Developing Dynamic Categorisations of Transit Migration’, *Population, Space and Place* 18/4 (2012) 468–481.