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Understanding foreign policy strategies during migration movements: a comparative study of Iraqi and Syrian mass refugee inflows to Turkey

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Abstract
This study contextualizes the foreign policy strategies of Turkey and its responses to the two most recent mass refugee flows from Iraq (1989–1991) and Syria (since 2011). Considering migration policy as part of foreign policy, we argue that the foreign policy strategy of a receiving country toward a refugee-sending country is decisive in determining policies adopted for refugees. While the cases stress humanitarian need as a legitimizing tool to mobilize international coalitions to establish safe havens, the Iraqi case, however, did not correspond with any goal of using the refugee inflow to affect Iraq’s domestic policies. Therefore, the strategy focused on strict containment of refugees at camps and repatriation. In the Syrian case, the strategies simultaneously utilize idealistic and pragmatic paradigms to assert Turkey’s involvement in matters in Syria, while maintaining an emphasis on security that has become exclusionary over time.

Keywords: Refugees; Syria; Iraq; Turkey; foreign policy

Introduction
States pursue different policies toward mass refugee inflows due to calculations and considerations of both domestic and international matters. This study deals with the questions of how and why foreign policy strategies interact with mass migration policies. The research seeks answers to this question by comparing Turkey’s foreign policies (TFP) for the two most recent mass refugee experiences: Iraqi refugees (1989–1991) and Syrian refugees (since 2011). We utilize a theoretical framework that approaches ‘migration policy as foreign policy’ and argue that state responses to the two mass inflows have been shaped by continuities and changes in foreign policy priorities. Additionally, this study asserts that mass migration policies are devised to legitimize foreign policy goals.

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This study also scrutinizes efforts by the refugee-receiving state to legitimate its foreign policy during refugee movements. We argue that the immediate goal of repatriating refugees who arrived in these mass inflows was part of the existing foreign policy agenda. The main legitimization efforts of the state in these two cases were focused on the number of people who had arrived, the humanitarian need to help incoming refugees, efforts to remind other countries of their burden-sharing responsibilities, and the need to act collectively to achieve repatriation free from the threat of persecution through the establishment of safe buffer zones. Yet, the foreign policy calculations with ideational and pragmatic elements made at the beginning of the Syrian case have created a need for proactive strategies such as the open-border policy for incoming refugees. The open-border policy was ideational in the sense that the incumbent government utilized humanitarian and religious discourse while responding to the refugee flow. Policy-makers often explicitly stated that the open-border policy for Syria had saved thousands of lives. Yet, it was also pragmatic; Turkey’s assertion of power and control in Syria was connected to its endgame and assumed the Syrian state would be re-established under the leadership of Turkey with a Turkey-friendly new regime. The refugees, therefore, would contribute to the new state formation in Syria. The policy was later transformed into a tightening of the border regime due to increased perceived security concerns after 2015. The failure of pragmatic goals, due to the volatile atmosphere and multiple actors involved who claimed to fill the power vacuum – including jihadist groups, Russia, and Kurds – has pushed Turkey to reiterate its safe havens arguments and prioritize a security-oriented approach based on its foreign policy interests.

The first part of the article presents the methodology used in this paper, followed by a discussion on the theoretical framework concerning the interconnections between foreign policy and mass refugee policies. The second part provides a brief historical background and the political context of the TFP during the mass refugee flows mentioned above. After introducing the theoretical framework, the article comparatively analyzes the use of mass refugee policies in TFP by looking at the policy preferences implemented and statements from incumbent heads of governments or key bureaucrats. The article then focuses on the discursive tools and practices adopted by Turkish governments to legitimize responses regarding the mass refugee flow in light of the foreign policy strategy. Lastly, it presents the legitimization efforts in foreign policy after the failure to mobilize humanitarian intervention for the crisis in Syria, which follows a different trajectory than the Iraqi crisis in 1991, reflecting a continuation of pre-2011 foreign policy strategies. After 2015, with the inclusion of other actors like the United States (US), Russia and Iran, the involvement of multiple actors has pushed Turkey to re-securitize its priorities and re-shape its refugee policy accordingly.
**Methodology**

Data for this study comes from official statements by policy-makers for Iraq (1988–1991) and Syria (2011–2018), as well as from five newspaper sources with different ideological stances, allowing us to trace the policies implemented and examine state strategies and official statements in the corresponding periods. Therefore, by adopting a process-tracing method in combination with comparative methods, the study aims to uncover the underlying mechanisms in how mass migration policies are devised to legitimize foreign policy goals. The method helps us to trace the links between possible causes of mass migration policies and evaluate the effect of existing foreign policy strategies. Additionally, it allows us to ensure that our explanation is compatible with findings obtained from key events during the refugee inflows. Furthermore, we make use of semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with bureaucrats who held office during the inflows to complement the analysis when needed. These expert interviews focused on how respondents perceived and approached the issue of refugee flows and their roles in the formation of the migration policies. We have chosen the Iraqi and Syrian cases as they are the two most recent mass refugee flows Turkey has experienced, occurred under two different administrations, and in a different international order. This variation enables us to observe and compare the effects of foreign policy considerations on mass migration policies adopted in the case of Turkey.

**Understanding the connection between mass migration and foreign policies**

Mass refugee movements, with their complex effects, have recently attracted scholarly attention in the discipline of international relations. Studies on state policy responses to mass migration have increased, especially over the last two decades. Studies on mass migration movements often utilize neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives. Neo-realist theories analyze the general concept of mass movements, with particular concern with the conflict in the countries of origin and securitization of flows across international borders, whereas the neo-liberal point of view analyses mass migration movements from perspectives of international co-operation or inter-governmental agencies’ role in the international system. However, this international regime paradigm that neoliberal accounts argue fails to offer effective solutions for the protection of refugees. Mertus argues that the response of the international community to the Bosnian, Somali and Haitian refugee flows showed that the international responses have changed, shifting from durable to temporary solutions and from protection to containment policies.
The increasing trend toward a more restrictive international refugee regime has pushed scholars to inquire about key factors in different policy responses to refugee flows. While nation-states play an undeniable role, additional research has also noted the importance of the international context – among other factors – in shaping policy responses. Yet, the role of the international context in some cases is complex, interrelated, and has a multidirectional relationship with the migration policies. For example, Özçürümez and Hamer’s study on Turkey and Canada argues that the international context had an ‘active impact’ on Turkey during refugee flows from Iran and Iraq, while displaying a weak effect in shaping Canada’s immigration policies in the 1980s and 90s; instead, they stress the importance of Canada’s refugee determination system design.

Given the importance of the international context during mass migration movements, in the existing literature, the first set of accounts also claim that foreign policy considerations affect the direction and inclusiveness of refugee policies. Herein, the prominent arguments are that refugee policies might be utilized to influence domestic policies of the sending country or that they are influenced by the relationship between the host and sending countries. Zolberg et al. call this selective policy the ‘Haitian-Cuban syndrome’.

During the 1980s, the US was willing to welcome asylum seekers from Cuba – a communist country unfriendly to the US – despite their inability to prove an individual threat of persecution. In contrast, asylum seekers from Haiti – not fleeing from a communist country – were not eligible to attain refugee status in the US. In these examples, the granting of refugee or asylum-seeker status, reflect the role of foreign policy considerations in the formulation of mass refugee policies.

Few studies have attempted to theorize the relationship between mass migration and foreign policies. While Miller and Papademetriou analyze ‘migration policy as foreign policy’ for heuristic purposes, Mitchell notes that there should be a distinction between them to differentiate among motivations behind the foreign policy, such as domestic concerns. Moreover, for the use of mass migration policies in foreign policy goals, Teitelbaum proposed a framework in which states can utilize mass inflows as policy instruments. He presents three connections between foreign policy and mass migration, in which their forms are multidirectional and continuous. First, foreign policies, especially military or political interventions, often produce mass migration movements across borders. Second, mass migration movements themselves can be utilized as a foreign policy tool. He uses the term ‘mass migration for unarmed conquest or assertion of sovereignty’ to describe governmental actions via civilian movements for these purposes. Tsourapas similarly looks at the strategic use of migration flows as a means to attain other aims under migration diplomacy.
Moreover, as discussed above, refugee-hosting countries can also formulate policies to gain leverage against adversarial sending countries to embarrass or threaten them. This is related to the third connection that Teitelbaum presents. The formulation of refugee policies can be influenced by the volume of refugees in host states, meaning the number of incoming refugees seems to be a highly important element, similar to a diaspora community and its mobilization power. Regarding this point, Greenhill introduces the concept of ‘coercive engineered migration (CEM),’ which is defined as the deliberate creation or manipulation of international migration to obtain military, political or economic benefits from another state.

Using the framework of CEM in the foreign-asylum-policy nexus, Aras and Mencütek analyze Turkey’s response to the Syrian refugee inflows and categorize three periods in the post-2011 era: assertive (2011–2013), internationalization through the United Nations (UN) (2013-mid-2015), and opportunistic with regard to the European Union’s (EU) securitization agenda in the post-2015 period. In the first phase, Turkey represented itself as a regional power with an assertive foreign policy regarding the humanitarian crisis in Syria. After unilateral efforts failed, the assertive foreign policy was supplanted by internationalization through the UN. In the third phase, Aras and Mencütek adopt the CEM framework to analyze Turkey as an opportunist seeking to gain political or monetary benefits from the EU, having also been affected by EU externalization policies regarding immigration and asylum. Similarly, Aras and Mencütek compare the governance of irregular migration regimes in Turkey as two distinct phases – 1990–2011 and the post-2011 era – mostly shaped by mass migrations from the Middle East, with the latter additionally affected by EU externalization policies. Additionally, they argue that the response in the 1990s was restrictive and security-oriented, whereas the post-2011 period was initially approached from a humanitarian perspective due to the ideology behind its foreign policy and regional interests but then returned to a securitization discourse. Their arguments present series of explanations incorporating the EU role on the one hand and ideology and securitization discourses on the other, categorizing the TFP by time period; unfortunately, this is not clear with regard to the actual impact of foreign policy on the refugee policy implemented.

Although we agree with the claim that the particular goal of Turkey – to become an active regional power with good relations in the neighborhood, making efforts toward mediation, humanitarianism and dialogue – played a role in the initial response in the post-2011 period, we argue that it is the foreign policy strategy plays the dominant role in responses to mass migration flows in both the cases of Iraqi and Syrian refugee flows. Dividing foreign policy responses into phases and stressing explanations – such as EU externalization in the post-2011 era or the role of the Cold War in 1991 – are not
sufficient to understand why such variations and U-turns occur, as in the case of a change from an open-border policy to a more security-oriented migration policy. Therefore, emphasizing similarities between responses in the Iraqi case – where there was no EU externalization – and the Syrian refugee case has a higher potential of revealing which motives contributed to the shaping of refugee policies. In the Syrian refugee context, we found the role of EU externalization is overemphasized within the literature in shaping the mass migration policies of Turkey. Instead, the primary strategy in the politics of migration for both cases can primarily be explained by a detailed look at the existing foreign policy framework and prioritizations of incumbent governments during mass flows. In doing so, one can understand whether the adopted migration policies are restrictive, humanitarian, or security oriented.

In this study, we therefore investigate how mass migration policies are devised as a means to legitimate foreign policy goals. Opportunistic use of the current refugee situation cannot be reduced to a simple bargaining tool to increase benefits from other state(s). Thus, we find the CEM and similar frameworks inadequate in explaining the foreign-migration policy nexus. Instead, this study takes a holistic perspective through comparative analysis, looking at two cases that resulted from different IR paradigms. For instance, in the post-2011 period, foreign policy with liberal and constructivist elements caused a shift in the nexus of the foreign policy compared to the 1991 period. This resulted in different policy formulations for the Syrian mass refugee flow in which Turkey put forward its security reflexes once again due to similar Kurdish sensitivity in the Syrian case followed by an exclusionary refugee regime.

Last, but not least, the institutional and structural dynamics cannot be separated from the international regime, such as the Cold War or the post-9/11 periods. This study intentionally opts out of discussing the role of structure, without underestimating its influence, to reveal the effect of foreign policy strategies on refugee policies. Therefore, the theoretical standpoint is inclusive of the agent side but departs from the literature by providing an intra-state comparative case analysis rather than comparing different states. The foreign policy responses formulated by policy-makers regarding mass refugee flows in two different real-world structures – the Cold War/post-Cold War and post-9/11 – under different governments at two different periods – the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) – can reveal continuities as well as changing policy directions. Therefore, this study is based on the assertion that the pre-existing foreign policy goal has a strong influence on the formulation of the adopted refugee policy. In other words, the policies that emerge during refugee flows serve to indicate a particular foreign policy motive. By comparatively and empirically showing this connection, this research aims to contribute to the literature that examines foreign policy’s
influential role and direct scholarly attention to the importance of foreign policy strategies, which are mostly taken for granted in the shaping of mass migration policies. The dynamism inherent in the assertion of a foreign policy on a contextual basis provides an opportunity to analyze other mass flows from the perspective of foreign policy by linking the nexus between foreign and migration policies.

Unpacking Turkey’s foreign policy during mass refugee flows

To better formulate the connection between foreign policy strategy and policies on a mass refugee flow, it is essential to discuss the overall foreign policy practices and general context of the refugee flows, reflecting significant policy adaptation to existing foreign policy assertions. As presented in the analytical section, using process tracing, we show that incumbent governments found comparatively similar ways to legitimize their policies regarding mass flows, displaying significant parallels with their broader foreign policy assertions in the region.

TFP under the Özal government and the state response to mass refugee flows from Iraq

Towards the end of the Cold-War period, the TFP demonstrated the expansion of foreign political activism under Turgut Özal (1983–1993). During this period, Özal started neoliberal reforms and closely allied with Western countries, especially the US. TFP during his terms also focused on the expansion of relations in Central Asia with Turkic countries and the Islamic world, underlining both Turkey’s national identity and its Islamic culture with a focus on its Ottoman past. As far as TFP toward the Middle East (ME) was concerned, Özal perceived regional ties opportunistically, especially regarding economic relations. He placed great importance on trade relations with neighboring countries in the ME with promising markets for Turkish industry. Iraq was Turkey’s second-largest trading partner after Germany, and exports to Iraq in 1990 reached a share of 8% of total exports with 2.5–3 billion US dollars annual trade between the two countries. Özal also advanced Turkey’s relations with the US and EU to exploit new opportunities and bolster Turkey’s role in the region. This economy-oriented foreign policy strategy changed after the war in Iraq:

The 91 Gulf War shook the Turkish economy because of Turkey’s commercial relations. Iraq at that time, before the war, after Germany, was Turkey’s second-largest foreign trade partner. Then, this turned into a export-oriented policy together with Özal’s policies of war. The war suddenly hit that economy and killed the whole region. Afterwards, Turkey carried on its foreign strategies in line with common interests with its Western ally, the US.
The utilitarian TFP under Özal also meant non-interference as Turkey’s economic interests were no longer profitable. Additionally, Turkey did not have the goal of intervening in Iraq to have a say over Iraq’s internal affairs and preferred to stay out of domestic matters there. In the first stages of the conflict in Iraq, following the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the Özal regime adopted a disinterested stance. TFP in this period was centered on neutrality towards Iraq due to its opposition to Kurdish nationalism and prioritization of the economic interdependence of the two countries; moreover, it followed principles of non-interference in Iraq’s internal matters.

The Iraqi refugee flow to Turkey consisted of three refugee waves that began in 1988 with 51,542 Northern Iraqis fleeing after the Iran-Iraq war. The second wave took place in 1989–1991, in the midst of which Iraq invaded Kuwait, and around 60 thousand Iraqis fled to Turkey. Finally, in March 1991, Saddam’s military operations against civilian opposition groups resulted in a total of 460,000 arrivals, making it the largest of the three refugee waves. The first two waves were considerably smaller, and a portion of the refugees were sent to third countries while the majority returned to Iraq. The Iraqis coming into Turkey created a chain reaction, leading to the displacement of more Iraqis. Shor after the military operations, Operation Provide Comfort, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis returned to Iraq within two-months period and only 14,000 asylum-seekers remained in Turkey, and by October 1991, the number had fallen to five thousand.

The first domestic reaction of the state to the third wave was not to officially open the borders (in contrast to the Syrian case) but to accept refugees due to humanitarian concerns. The geographic and environmental conditions of the border between Iraq and Turkey led to de facto acceptance of refugees coming through the mountains in harsh winter conditions. The immediate response, though not openly admitted, was to welcome and provide basic humanitarian services to the refugees, with strict containment of the flow to buffer zone camps inside Turkey to enable mass returns, reflecting the prioritization of the security agenda related to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party).

In this period, Turkey’s diplomatic actions at the UN Security Council (UNSC) sought an exit strategy, and Turkish diplomats proposed a ‘safe haven’ for Iraqi refugees in Iraq. However, Turkish military forces failed to stop the mass inflows of refugees, whose numbers were increasing every day. Unable to obtain the kind of international financial assistance requested by the Turkish state, President Özal tried to convince US President George H. W. Bush that support should be given to Turkey. As a result of these efforts, UNSC Resolution 688 was passed on 5 April 1991; it identified the crisis as a threat to international peace and security, demanding the Iraqi government end the repression of Iraqi civilians and allow international organizations to aid the displaced.
the creation of ‘safe havens’ patrolled by allied aircraft to prevent further arrivals in Turkey. Additionally, US President Bush launched ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ to establish a ‘security zone.’ With support provided by US and international forces, 460,000 refugees were repatriated from Turkey, and the rest were settled in third countries.

**TFP under the AKP government and the state response to mass refugee inflows from Syria**

There are many studies examining whether there has been continuity in the TFP since the Özal period or if there is a newly assertive and more active TFP affected by domestic and international dynamics. For example, Kirdiş analyzes changes in the TFP from the perspective of how identity has affected domestic politics during the AKP era, particularly with regard to AKP utilization of foreign policy to construct an identity for itself. AKP leadership claims to give voice to oppressed majorities from different geographies, which is parallel to its domestic stance of advocating for the conservative majority from the ‘peripheries’ against the oppression of elites. Yet, while the AKP has utilized a populist strategy in foreign policy to sustain its power and domestic approval for its claim to defend the rights of the oppressed, the TFP has experienced crises. Some scholars argue that proactiveness – taking an active stance in international matters after the Arab uprisings – has jeopardized previously envisioned long-term foreign policy strategies and presented concerns that such assertive proactivism may be unproductive and ineffective in attaining regional power influence. Yet, proactivism can also be interpreted as a response to turbulent ME politics. As the severity of disruptions have increased, policy-makers in TFP have chosen not to be passive on matters happening next door, as in the case of Syria.

These competing stances in TFP are reflected in Turkey’s policies towards Syria. Despite Davutoglu’s prominent policy of ‘zero problems with neighbors’ as a form of liberal institutionalism and the main principles of Turkey’s regional policy of ‘dialogue as a means of solving the crisis’ and ‘security for everyone,’ Turkey’s mediation-centered foreign policy has not only diminished, but the policies have also focused more on realpolitik concerns. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated after security problems at the border and Syrian’s downing of a Turkish jet in 2012. Additionally, the refusal of the Syrian regime to stop its violent attacks on civilians and respond to demands for reform changed TFP toward Syria as of 2011 and ended the rapprochement between the two countries that started in 2003. After Turkey began supporting the opposition in the on-going conflict in Syria, its foreign policy was no longer perceived as objective and dialogue-oriented. Moreover, it is argued that Ankara misread the self-
confidence in previous efforts of dialogue as a means of solving the crisis and defending the rights of the oppressed in asserting a proactive stance in the post-2011 period, interpreting this as the right to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, by urging the international community to change the Assad regime, Turkey was taking a side in a regional conflict for the first time in TFP history.\textsuperscript{57}

**Comparative analysis: legitimization efforts for international mobilization**

The decision to establish a coalition safe zone in the country of origin in both the 1991 Iraqi and post-2011 Syrian cases indicates similar goals but results from different policies based on overall foreign policy aspirations. Within rational theory approaches in international relations, when states calculate their interests, it is neither rational nor in a state’s interests to accept hundreds of thousands of people for an unknown period of time and provide them with certain living standards due to the high economic costs and security issues. Therefore, the policies analyzed below regarding TFP indicate a similar strategy of stopping the flow and repatriating refugees as soon as possible through international coalitions. The expectation that the refugees’ stay would be temporary was followed by a state-planned containment policy in both cases, demonstrating that repatriation was compatible with the overall goals pursued by foreign policy.

For the Iraqi flow, the overall TFP for the Middle East was security-oriented and based on economic calculations. As relations in the region deteriorated, the Özal government put the humanitarian and security issues on its diplomatic agenda, as part of a legitimizing effort, and constructed a foreign policy strategy to convince international actors and establish a buffer zone on the Iraqi side to repatriate refugees. Turkey specifically did not take a side or display any intention of intervening against Saddam’s regime. On the contrary, President Özal, with the support of the US, called on the governments of Iran and Syria to oppose intervention and said, ‘If others do not interfere with the interior matters of Iraq, again, Iraq will probably find the best solution.’\textsuperscript{58} Additionally, in a statement on US news network CNN, Özal asserted that Turkey was staying out of the situation in Iraq and was already providing ‘humanitarian aid’ not only to the Kurds but to all Iraqi people.\textsuperscript{59} Similarly, Ambassador Mustafa Akşin of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN reiterated the international humanitarian burden-sharing responsibilities and Turkey’s unwillingness to get further involved:

We have enough problems. In particular, we have important economic issues that we face after the Gulf war. No other country can cope with this huge problem formed of migrants. We will not allow mass migration at such a scale. We are not in a position to help. We cannot soothe these people’s
Turkey’s indifferent foreign policy towards Iraq was also observed in Turkey limiting itself to humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers and seeking repatriation of migrants regardless of the situation in Iraq, which was in line with the overall foreign policy. However, another security-oriented foreign policy goal played a role. Here, we should add that Turkey’s stance on this issue was heavily influenced by the securitization of Kurdish identity. While Turkey took careful foreign policy actions to ensure humanitarian intervention was followed by international coalition diplomacy to create a safe zone for Iraqi refugees across its borders in Iraq, it pre-emptively suppressed the solution of establishing an independent Kurdish state by mobilizing international actors. The fact that humanitarian intervention in the region was quite limited and the majority of northern Iraqis did not receive help confirm the view that international forces were deployed in the region first and foremost for the benefit of Turkey, not refugees; this allowed Turkey to assert a security-oriented goal in the region. The interview held with an incumbent bureaucrat also served during the Iraqi refugee flow compared this security emphasis of both periods as in the following:

When we look at the Kurds coming from Northern Iraq, we can easily argue that the state did not embrace the Kurdish population and mostly adopted the reflexes of that period and did not make any medium-long term planning. When we look at Turkey’s foreign policy since the 2000s, it is more open, and a bit distanced from nationalist reflexes. It is more aware of regional realities and structures involved as well as the weight and its institutional capacity, and therefore followed a more risk-taking approach proportionally.

The non-interventionist policy of the 1990s conflicts with the Syrian policies, where the AKP government’s foreign policy perspective has concentrated on making Turkey a regional power, a decision-maker and an active player regarding matters in Syria. The aim has been to include refugees because of their potential to play a crucial future role in re-establishing Syria, which is discussed more in detail below, with idealism and pragmatism playing dual roles. While the Özal government stressed that they had no intention of intervening in the internal matters of Iraq, the AKP government, in contrast, has stressed that it is not possible for Turkey to remain silent on the Syrian issue; hosting refugees who fled Syria was a result of setting foreign policy aspirations with a humanitarian element on the agenda. Yet, similar to Iraq, Turkey also pursued the goal of reducing the humanitarian burden by establishing safe havens in Syria.

In both the Syrian and Iraqi cases, we can argue that the level of foreign policy proximity to the refugee-sending country is decisive in the refugee policies adopted. While both cases stressed humanitarian need as a legitimizing
tool to mobilize international coalitions to establish safe havens, the Iraqi case, however, did not correspond with any goal that might benefit from using the refugee inflows to affect Iraq’s domestic policies. Therefore, the foreign policy strategy focused on international mobilization as part of strict containment at the camps and the immediate return of refugees. In contrast, Turkey’s foreign policy aspiration of becoming a decisive actor in the region led to an open-border and encampment policy in the Syrian case, allowing the free movement of people and flexible mobility inside Turkey. At the same time, however, the TFP also pushed for a safe haven strategy to diminish and control mobility inside Syria. This failed to succeed in 2012.

TFP’s coalition goal to establish safe zones failed: what happened next?

The foreign policy strategy under the AKP was also to push the exodus to safe havens inside Syria and head off further arrivals. Therefore, a similar diplomatic strategy to the Özal period was initiated; a significant difference in the TFP was Turkey’s desire to become the decision-maker in Syrian affairs. In August 2012, Turkey accelerated diplomatic efforts to convince the international community to establish no-fly zones inside Syria, which had continued for over a year. Contrary to Özal’s statements of non-interference – but in line with AKP strategic and hegemonic plans in the region – on September 2012, Davutoğlu stressed that Turkey was not only interested in taking part in a voluntary military coalition but also sought leadership ‘over all matters related to Syria.’ At that time, Davutoğlu’s critical stance toward the inactivity of the international community and the UNSC gave Turkey a legitimate foreign policy aspiration with the presence of 130,000 refugees in Turkey and the power gap threat that could be filled by terrorist organizations like al-Qaida and the PKK in 2012. The failure of the AKP government to convince the international community to establish safe havens played a critical role in the prioritization of both short- and long-term goals. Long-term calculations in the post-Assad period and future relations with Syria involved an ideal strategy – with pragmatic and humanitarian aspects – in which Turkey wished to be the actual decision-maker in the region. This continued until 2015. Then, Turkey decided to re-prioritize security-based foreign policy as the war became protracted and became a multi-sided game with other major actors threatening important TFP priorities in the region. As Turkey’s interests in the region were threatened, this forced recalculations to assert offensive and security-oriented foreign policy, particularly in the aftermath of the US backing of Kurdish forces against Islamists in 2015 and direct arming of the Kurdish/YPG (People’s Protection Units)-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) since May 2017, giving idealism and open-border policy regarding mass refugees secondary importance to security.
**Foreign policy fluctuating between idealism and pragmatism**

Until 2015, the pragmatic aspect of the Syrian refugee influx in foreign policy can be interpreted as opportunistic, as Turkey was not successful in stopping the flow or containing it inside Syria. President Erdoğan even threatened to open Turkey’s borders with Europe, linking the refugee issue to EU-accession talks. However, the foreign policy strategy signaled different constellations as a result of the multi-dimensional aspect of the TFP: stop the sea-crossing, share the host burden with other states, and achieve visa liberalization and EU-accession goals, as argued by a top-level bureaucrat in the foreign ministry:

> We started negotiations with the EU. Actually, we saw this as an opportunity. We were already going to stop this migration, we needed to stop it; it was a human tragedy, [especially the] Aylan baby case. But meanwhile, we should have taken what we could from Europe while continuing to take measures to stop migration but not let Turkey to pay the cost.

The bureaucrat we interviewed stressed that these complex strategic calculations could also be seen in citizenship policies, signaling idealism and pragmatism going hand-in-hand, which reflects a continuation in the foreign policy aspirations of Turkey:

> We gave citizenship selectively in the beginning, usually to those who are political leaders, some of which were important businesspeople. It was very scarce. Why, because if we did not give it [citizenship], someone else would. Why did we embrace the Syrian opposition? If we did not, the Syrian opposition would go to Paris or be organized in London. After that, it would not be possible to direct [their] Syrian policy.

Additionally, the encampment policies under AFAD (the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency), the strengthening of the role of the Directorate General of Migration Management in the Ministry of the Interior, the extension of the ‘Temporary Protection Regime,’ continued registration of refugees, the strategic access to citizenship for highly-skilled Syrians, and harmonization programs for Syrian refugees can be considered a demonstration of the ways Turkey’s concern for humanitarian aspects of the disaster have both ideational and pragmatic elements, including short- and long-term calculations for the domestic environment as well as for the post-Assad regime. As the stay of Syrians in Turkey has lengthened and the influx continues – reaching more than 3.5 million people – the temporary protection regime and refugee governance policies have begun to unite with a need for integration and increasing the welfare and well-being of Syrians through cooperation with the EU, UN and international support through civil society and bilateral agreements. These developmental policies aim to support domestic integration, but they might still be considered as related to Turkey’s foreign policy goal of playing a role in the post-Assad regime.
Last stage: less humanitarianism and more security

The continuing flow of refugees and the threat of Kurdish empowerment have created a dual security and humanitarian agenda for the TFP. The continuing influx of refugees threatened the traditional border principle of nation-states; meeting this humanitarian need represented a high cost to the state economy. At the same time, the security dimension – related to the potential for terrorism – also necessitated limiting the flow. Although the trajectory of the TFP initiated in 2011 was built on a Syria free from Assad, as Russia, Iran and the US became involved in Syrian affairs as critical agenda-setters, the priorities of the TFP have shifted away from the proactive TFP of pushing ‘a Syria without-Assad’ to a neo-realist one after 2015. As the involvement in Syria has become international and the role of Syrian people in shaping the future of Syria diminished, the TFP has focused on alternative strategies.

Conflicting interests with the US over supporting Kurdish forces led Turkey to accept Assad remaining in power and approaching Russia. This has led to a policy conversion concentrated on refugee settlement in areas cleared of Kurdish forces and the Islamic state. The securitization of TFP has brought a tightening of the border regime and closure of the borders to new refugee flows, forcing refugees to seek irregular border crossings. As Turkey’s soft and military powers’ presence in northern Syria considered such as AFAD, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Syrian opposition and Turkish military forces, there has been a return to the original containment plan but with a different agenda due to changes in TFP strategies. Operation Euphrates Shield – a cross-border operation in collaboration with the Free Syrian Army against the Kurdish-led militia YPG and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) between 24 August 2016, and 29 March 2017 – sought to establish safe-zones inside Syria and fight terrorist groups in Northern Syria. At the moment, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are hosted inside camps in Syria. On 1 November 2018, the Turkish Defense Minister stated that 260,000 Syrians had returned to Syria since the beginning of the operation.69 Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu reiterated the safe haven strategy of Turkey’s military operations, with an emphasis on the goals of humanitarianism, security, and repatriation.70 In the spring of 2019, this time through the ‘Peace Spring’ operations, Turkey neared its goal of creating safe zones to enable the safe return of Syrian refugees in areas free from YPG/SDF forces. This time, Turkey unilaterally pursued its security goals against US-backed YPG/SDF forces.

The overall foreign policy emphasis on the migration policy of Turkey displays a critical connection to the TFP adopted. Generally speaking, policy strategies regarding mass flows adopted in destination states seem highly responsive to the state’s foreign policy agenda. In the Turkish case, these migration policies are intertwined with Turkey’s strategic plans for the
future of Syria and the prioritization of security due to the protracted nature of Turkey’s Kurdish conflicts and border safety. These have affected Turkey’s inclusion and exclusion policies, allowing flexible movement of refugees inside Turkey (the pre-2015 period) or blocking further arrival of refugees from Syria (the post-2015 period).

**Conclusion**

The strategic selection of the Turkish case during two recent refugee inflows – the Iraqi mass refugee flow of 1989–1991 and the Syrian flow since 2011 – allows us to compare the effects of different foreign policy priorities on state policies towards mass refugee movements. This study approaches mass refugee policies as part of foreign policy. Turkey’s refugee policies for these two refugee flows represent highly similar cases in terms of a foreign policy strategy incorporating the safe havens argument and efforts to contain the refugee flows. The TFP in the Iraqi case stressed non-interference in Iraqi affairs as part of its impartial foreign policy, with a slight change under the Özal government. As the refugee flows continued in 1991, existing foreign policy with security interests was prioritized due to the pre-existing Kurdish issue.

State responses to the two mass flows differ as strategic foreign policy aspirations diverged from previous governments and turned to proactive actions incorporating ideational and pragmatic goals under the AKP. AKP foreign policy prior to the Syrian refugee flow asserted the goal of becoming a regional power, together with practices highlighting historical and religious ties through visa liberations, opening the borders, and encouraging trade, social and cultural relations between the two countries. Yet following the post-2011 period, as negotiations failed between Syria and Turkey, Turkey deliberately sided with opposition groups and welcomed refugees due to humanitarian, ideational, and pragmatic goals in order to affect both the short- and long-term situation across its borders, having a clear agenda of rebuilding Syria in line with its interests. The strategic foreign policy calculations are in line with the responses to the Syrian refugee inflows as Turkey pursued an open-border policy, representing a continuation of AKP foreign policy until 2015. After the US started to support Kurdish forces against Islamists and other major actors like Russia and Iran have sought to keep Assad in power, the complexity of the Syrian issue has pushed Turkey to consider alternative strategies in Syria, distancing itself from the previous strategy of planning for Syria without the Assad regime. Since 2015, as policy-makers in TFP have accepted that the Syrian regime would stay in power, TFP has prioritized blocking the rise of Kurdish groups and seeking border security. The end of the open-border regime also coincided with this transformation in security-oriented foreign policy. Therefore, the
humanitarian open-border has become a closed one with efforts to resettle IDPs and push for voluntary returns to territories under Turkey’s control inside Syria. The policy responses of Turkey in the management of refugee flows seem strongly affected by the foreign policy strategies of incumbent governments, with a quick U-turn to a securitized approach and the containment and blocking of refugees.

Future research is still needed to provide more insights into the mechanisms at work and generalize the effects of varying foreign policy strategies on mass migration policies. For example, the cases of Libya and Jordan during the Syrian refugee flows to these countries could also help generalize the effects of foreign policy strategies of host states. Additionally, cases outside the Middle East and Global South, or in countries not neighboring refugee-sending countries may offer different findings to help understand the complex nature of policies adopted for refugees.

Notes

1. In this paper, the term ‘refugee inflow’ refers to people who flee their country en masse. A mass inflow is defined as occurring over a relatively short period of time, with large numbers of people fleeing their place of residence. Additionally, while we use the term ‘refugee,’ we should note that Syrians and Iraqis are not considered refugees in Turkey as they arrived en masse, and Turkey maintains the ‘geographical limitation’ framework of the 1951 Convention. This keeps Syrians under a ‘temporary protection’ status and therefore hinders their ability to acquire permanent settlement in Turkey.
2. Papademetriou and Miller, “The Unavoidable Issue.”
3. See Bagdonas, “Reading Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”
4. Data obtained from a research project funded by TÜBITAK, see acknowledgements.
5. The newspapers covered are the following: Hürriyet, Sabah, Cumhuriyet, Orta-doğu, and Milli Gazete.
7. We excluded the Bulgarian mass influx of 1989, as the Bulgarians were deemed to be of Turkish descent and belong to Turkish culture (soydaş) under the Settlement Law.
8. Betts and Loescher, Refugees in International Relations; Betts, Forced Migration and Global Politics; and Gökalp-Aras and Mencütek, “From Assertive to Opportunist Usage.”
10. Betts, Forced Migration and Global Politics; Betts, Global Migration Governance, and Koslowski, Global Mobility Regimes.
21. Teitelbaum, “Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy.”
22. Ibid., 437.
24. Ibid., 441.
27. Ibid., 100–1.
28. Ibid., 103.
29. Ibid., 95.
31. Ibid., 85–6.
32. The Council of Europe only asked Turkey to lift its geographical limitation to the Geneva Convention and requested it not adopt discriminatory policies based on refugee ethnicity.
33. İçduygucu and Keyman, “Globalization, Security, and Migration.”
35. Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy.”
36. TOBB, “Türkiye ve Irak.”
37. Ibid.
38. Interview #1 with a former UN officer, Istanbul, February 27, 2018.
41. İçduygucu and Sirkeci, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Göç Hareketleri.
42. Ibid., 265–6.
43. Kaynak, Iraklı Sığınmacılar ve Türkiye, 49.
44. A Kurdish military group long-listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU, and the US.
48. Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy.”
50. Kırdış, “The Role of Foreign Policy.”
51. Ibid., 185.
52. Özpek and Yaşar, “Populism and Foreign Policy,” 212.
53. Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions.”
54. Davutoğlu, “Zero Problems Foreign Policy.”
55. Özcan, Köse, and Karakoç, “Assessments of Turkish Foreign Policy.”
56. Altıok and Karşıyaka, “Recalibrating Turkish Foreign Policy.”
59. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
67. Interview #3 with a bureaucrat in Office, Istanbul, April 9, 2018.
68. Ibid.

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