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Introduction

Turkey is part of a migration system that is spread over a large geographical area including Europe, Asia, Middle East and North Africa; which is resulting from geopolitical and historical factors and transformed by local, regional, and international events. The migration flows that Turkey experienced have changed throughout the phases of modern Turkey’s history. In the Early Republican era from 1923 to 1950, as a part of the nation building process, Turkey saw mass emigration of its non-Muslim populations and the arrival of Muslims from the Balkans. In the period from 1950 to 1980, Turkey was mainly characterized as a country of emigration which attempted to recover its economy by sending thousands of migrants to Europe as a solution to unemployment and in order to receive remittances. The period after 1980’s saw many developments in the migratory movements. One was the increase in the number of asylum seekers from Turkey, due to the military coup and the Kurdish question. Another development in the 1980s was the arrival of economic migrants into Turkey due to the socioeconomic transformation in the region. Thus, standing at the crossroads of three continents, today, Turkey is a country of emigration, immigration and transit migration. At the same time, the prospect of European Union membership has been an important aspect of Turkey’s historical modernization project and its political relations to the EU have been very influential in the formation of its migration policy making.

Within this context and along the guidelines provided by the EUMAGINE project, this report first gives a historical and socio-economic overview of Republic of Turkey and provides an analysis of migration flows and policies in Turkey. Then, the four research areas of Turkey, namely Emirdağ and Dinar in Afyon; Van Merkez in Van and Fatih in Istanbul selected for EUMAGINE research are described.
Country Background

An Overview

Geography in General

Geographically, Turkey, a mountainous Eurasian country with a strategic location, is situated in the Anatolian peninsula, located in Western Asia, Eastern Thrace and south-eastern Europe. It covers an area of approximately 780,580 square kilometres and is bordered by eight countries: Bulgaria to the northwest (240 km); Greece to the west (206 km); Georgia to the northeast (252 km); Armenia (268 km), Azerbaijan (9 km) and Iran to the east (499 km); and Iraq (352 km) and Syria to the southeast (822 km); making a total of 2,648 kilometers. These borders remain unchanged since 1938, but there have been significant changes in the control and management of these borders as a result of population movements and political developments.
Internally, Turkey is divided into seven geographical regions according to their climate, location, flora and fauna, human habitat, agricultural diversities, transportation, topography and etc.\(^2\) Four regions were named after the seas bordering them - the Aegean Region, the Black Sea Region, the Marmara Region and the Mediterranean Region. The three other regions were named in accordance with their location in the Anatolian peninsula - Central, Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia Regions. Based on their development levels, we can rank these regions from the most developed to the least, as the following:

1. Marmara is one of the two most industrial regions and it is where Istanbul-the largest city is located. Marmara Region, a major destination for internal migration, is the smallest in area surface and the most densely populated region. This region is also a hub for international transit and irregular migrants.

2. Aegean Region is one of the two most industrial regions and being the second on the list for high population density, it is also where Izmir- the third largest city of Turkey is located.

3. Central Anatolian Region is where Turkey”s capital Ankara- the second largest city is situated. Despite the fact that the capital is located here, this region has many underdeveloped parts.

4. Mediterranean Region is well developed in tourism and its economical income corresponds to one third of the total tourism industry of Turkey.

5. Black Sea Region has fertile lands in its coastline. However, as the coastline is very narrow, the agriculture is not sufficient to create effective income for its population and therefore, this region generates internal migration.

6. South Eastern Anatolia, a region with dry and mostly infertile lands, consists of a major Kurdish population and has been facing armed clashes between the Turkish State and the PKK\(^3\) for more than twenty five years. Along with internal migrants, the region also generates internally displaced people (IDPs) due to the conflict situation.

7. Eastern Anatolia, a region located in a mountainous area with short summers and tough winter conditions, is heavily populated by Kurdish population. Due to the armed

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\(^2\) The EU uses a statistical region classification named as the NUTS which divides Turkey into 26 NUTS-2 regions and 12 NUTS-1 regions.

\(^3\) Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an armed group founded in 1978 announced by the Turkish State as a terrorist organization.
conflict between the PKK and Turkish army since the end of the 1980s, this region has been a generator of internal migrants and IDPs.

Demography

The figures in 2010 demonstrate that the population of Turkey is 72.5 million with a growth rate of 1.45 percent per year (Koç et. al., 2010). Turkey has a young population structure as a result of high fertility rates and growth rates in the recent past. People within the 15–64 age group constitute 67 percent of the total population, the 0–14 age group corresponds to 26 percent of the population, and 65 years and higher of age correspond to 7 percent of the total population. Life expectancy stands at 71.1 years for men and 75.3 years for women, with an average of 73.2 years for the populace as a whole. Total fertility rate in Turkey is approximately two children. The average population density is 92 persons per km².  

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey’s demography can be considered in a transition period in which there is a shift to low and controlled levels of mortality and fertility (Behar, 2006; TÜSGAD, 1999; SIS, 1995). Until the year 1975, Turkey experienced rapid demographic growth due to the expansion of health services and a pro-nationalist policy (Tauber, 1958). Growth was especially rapid between 1950 and 1975, when the population increased by over 2.5 percent per year (MoH, HIPS, and DHS Macro, 1995). However, a rapid decline in fertility

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4 The figures in this paragraph are compiled from various sources published by TURKSTAT, Turkish Statistical Institute. [www.tuik.gov.tr](http://www.tuik.gov.tr).
took place after 1975 as a result of the new population control policies which were adopted in the early 1960s and strengthened after the 1980s.

The founding fathers of the Republic aimed to create an urbanized country with a literate population as part of their modernity project (Keyman and Ğçduygu, 2005:6). Yet, the population in the cities increased only gradually. In 1927, of the approximately 13 million population, only 16 percent lived in urban areas. In 1950, this figure was still less than 20 percent (Ğçduygu, 2004:98). In 2003, the proportion of people who lived in urban areas had grown to 65 percent and today it has reached to 75.5 percent. The introduction of the Latin alphabet in 1928 was the major move to create a literate population. The literacy rate steadily increased from 11 percent in 1927, to 32 percent in 1950, 69 percent in 1980 and finally 86 percent in 2009.  

The changes in demographics in Turkey were not limited to mortality, fertility, or urbanization rates, but also the ethnic and religious composition of the population has changed dramatically. Turkey today is generally considered to be a Muslim country due to its more than 99 percent Muslim population based on a majority of Sunnis (85 to 90 percent of the Muslim population) of Hanafi faith and a minority of Alewites (10 to 15 percent of the Muslim population). However, historically Turkey had a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual population (Ğçduygu, ToktaĞ, and Soner, 2008:360). Minorities in Turkey can be studied under two categories. The first is the officially recognized minority groups which are Armenians, Greeks and Jews who were granted official recognition in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and with educational, social and religious rights. However, their population fell from three percent in the 1920s to less than two per thousand in present-day Turkey (Ğçduygu and KiriĢci, 2009:2; Table 1). The second category of minorities is the minority groups which have no special legal ground such as Arabs, Assyrians, Caucasians, Kurds, Roma etc. who have also been subjected to policies aiming at homogenizing the population of Turkey as in the case of their non Muslim counterparts (Minority Rights Group, 2007:3).

Political Environment and Administration

Turkey is a parliamentary representative democracy. Since its foundation as a republic in 1923, Turkey has developed a strong tradition of secularism. Turkey’s Constitution governs the legal

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5 For details, see Historical Background.  
6 The figures in this paragraph are compiled from various sources published by TURKSTAT, Turkish Statistical Institute. [www.tuik.gov.tr](http://www.tuik.gov.tr).
framework of the country, sets out the main principles of government and establishes Turkey as a unitary centralized state. The current constitution was adopted in 1982 under the military rule of the 1980 coup d’état. Several changes were made in the Constitution since then, and the country is going to referendum for further substantial changes in the Constitution in September 2010.

Based on the decision made in the referendum held in 2007, the President is elected for a five-year term by people’s vote and first presidential elections based on people’s vote will be held in 2012. Executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers which make up the government, while the legislative power is vested in the unicameral parliament, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature, and the Constitutional Court is charged with ruling on the conformity of laws and decrees with the Constitution. The Prime Minister is charged by the President to form the government and it is most often the head of the party having gained the most seats in parliament. The Prime Minister can take office only after his/her government secures a vote of confidence in the parliament.

The parliament is made up of 550 members who are elected for a four-year term by a party-list proportional representation system from 85 electoral districts which represent the 81 administrative provinces of Turkey (İstanbul is divided into three electoral districts, Ankara and İzmir are each divided into two because of their large populations). Only parties winning at least 10 percent of the votes cast in a national parliamentary election gain seats in the parliament. As a result of this threshold, in the 2007 elections three parties formally entered the parliament.

Turkey has a very strong central authority. Administrative units are divided into provinces and sub-provinces. In the 81 provinces of Turkey, a Governor appointed by the central authority and a Mayor elected through local elections are the main authorities. Provinces are divided into subprovinces governed by an appointed sub-province Governor (kaymakam) and an elected Mayor at the sub-province level. Sub-provinces are divided into neighborhoods (mahalles) which are represented by a head of the neighborhood (mukhtar), elected in the same local elections.

Economy

Throughout the 20th century, Turkey has moved from an agriculture based economy to an industry based one (Pamuk, 2008). Currently, Turkey is classified within the G-20, among the twenty most important industrialized and developing economies. Based on demographic, economic and social indicators, Turkey is ranked as a high development country by UNDP human development index.
(HDI) and clustered as an upper middle income country by the World Bank with its GDP per capita that exceeded $ 10,000 in 2008. It is ranked as the 79th country in 2009 HDI (Table 2).

However, Turkey’s performance is poorer in some of these social economic indicators. For instance, it has the lowest female labor force participation (LFP) rate among European and Central Asian (ECA) countries (WB, 2009: 1). Unlike OECD and ECA countries where the increasing numbers of women are participating in the labor market, since 1980s, female LFP in Turkey is decreasing due to urbanization and the decline in employment in the agricultural sector where women are traditionally employed (WB, 2009: 10). Regarding gender equality measures such as GDI7 and GEM8, Turkey’s performance is poorer than its HDI ranking. For instance, GDI value pertaining to 2007, 0.788 is 97.8 percent of Turkey’s HDI value of 0.806. Out of the 155 countries with both HDI and GDI values, 125 countries have a better ratio than Turkey's (UNDP, 2009).9

Health care

Health care in Turkey is dominated by a centralized state system run by the Ministry of Health (MoH). In 2003, the government introduced a sweeping health reform program aimed at making health care available to a larger share of the population. Increasing the ratio of subsidized private health care provision was a substantial part of this reform initiative. The number of hospitals in the year 2008 had reached 1,350 with a steady increase from 1,317 in 2007, 1,204 in 2006 and 1,155 in 2002. The number of hospital beds in the year 2008 had reached 188,065 which was equal to 22.3 hospital beds per 10,000 people. In 2008, the number of doctors per 1,000 people was 1.58. The proportion of total health expenditures to the GDP was 4.9 percent in 2009 and 4.85 in 2008.10 The proportion of health budget to the total state budget in the year 2010 is 4.86 percent.11

Education

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7 Gender Development Index
8 Gender Empowerment Measure
11 Cumhuriyet Newspaper, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?im=yhs&hn=88606, view date: July 2010
Turkish education system mandates eight years of primary education between the ages of 6 and 14. Children of 14 to 18 years can continue to high school in public, distance-learning, or vocational high schools. In the educational year of 2008-2009, the percentage of the graduates of primary school education who continued in high school was 85.2 percent. In the educational year of 2008-2009, the number of students per class was 33.4 in primary education institutions and 35.1 in high schools. The proportion of total education expenses to the GDP was 10.64 in 2009 and 10.30 in 2008. The proportion of education budget to the total state budget in the year 2010 is 9.85 percent.  

12 The figures in this paragraph are compiled from [www.turkegitimsen.org](http://www.turkegitimsen.org), view date: July 2010
Historical Background and Present Situation

The major political, economical and social changes in the history of modern Turkey can be studied in four periods. The first period, from the year 1923 to 1950, is the Early Republican period during which the nation state was being constructed under the one party rule. From 1950 to 1980 is the period of the multi-party regime and the strengthening of the nation state. The period from 1980 to 2000 can be perceived as a period of democratic consolidation and economic liberalization. From the year 2000 until the present day can be regarded as the period in which the EU candidacy and its effects are becoming more significant (Ğçduygu, 2010:2).

1923-1950

Defeated in the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was being partitioned by Allied Powers. The Turkish War of Independence between the Allies of World War I and the Ankara-based Grand National Assembly of Turkey led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ended with the victory of the Turkish national movement. As a consequence, the Peace Treaty of Lausanne was signed leading to the international recognition of the sovereign Republic of Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire.

The political atmosphere in the 1923-1950 period was based on constructing the nation-state. Turkey entered a single party era under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal who was the founder of the Republican People”s Party (CHP). The main target during the foundation of the Turkish Republic was to „reach the contemporary level of civilization” by creating a modern nation-state, defined by its main element- Westernization (Keyman and Ğçduygu, 2005:4, 74). Many political reforms were done: the abolition of the office of the caliphate formerly held by the Ottoman sultan, trials for multi-party regime and the voting rights for women. During this period, the Islamic Law was abandoned and replaced with a secular civil code (based on Swiss Civil Code) and penal code (based on Italian Penal Code) (Ahmad, 1993).

Economic reforms were also needed to recover the heavily indebted and dependent economy inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The Lausanne Peace Conference defined the international economic framework for Turkey and it was agreed during the conference that the new republic would be free to pursue its own commercial policies after 1929. The construction of new railroads, nationalization of the existing companies, industrialization and creation of a national bourgeoisie were seen as important steps. In 1930, a new strategy of etatism promoted the state as a leading producer and investor in the urban sector. The First Five-Year industrial plan
was adopted in 1934 and soon, economic enterprises that belonged to the state started taking essential roles as producers in many key sectors. Although Turkey did not participate in the Second World War, a full scale mobilization during the war had catastrophic effects on the economy and caused a decline in the popularity of the CHP (Pamuk, 2008:280).

The early Republic also aimed to make reforms in the social sphere. Creation of a new society and a new national identity were essential to the building of the nation state and the modernity project. The target was to abandon the traditional society that was based on agricultural economy and a rural population and instead, to create a modern society which was based on industry and an urban population. This modern society was to be accompanied by individualism, enlightenment and urbanism. This movement to refashion the society had a top-down approach due to the lack of bourgeoisie (Keyman, 2005). Creation of the national identity, another vital step for the nation state project, depended largely on the Turkification and Muslimization in the population, as explained in the Overview.

In the international arena, the Republic’s face has been firmly directed towards the West and Turkish foreign policy was closely aligned with the Western world. Thus, Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, a member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and a member of NATO in 1952.

1950-1980

The internal politics of the period of 1950 to 1980 consist of many new developments. The single party regime ended in 1946 with the participation of the Democrat Party (DP) in the first multi-party elections (Ahmad, 2008:32). In 1950, the DP won the second democratic elections of Turkish history. Although this era is taken as the starting point of the democratic transition in Turkey, the process was interrupted by military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Military coups resulted in the overthrow of democratically elected governments, closure of political parties and intensive constitutional changes regarding civil liberties and political rights. The military was always willing to soon return to the democratic system and the democracy was restored quickly and smoothly after each coup (Özbudun, 2000: 13). Nonetheless, the military’s high degree of autonomy severely weakened the functioning of democracy in Turkey (Cizre, 2008:332).

1950s saw positive developments in the economy. Thanks to the liberal economic program pursued by the DP, the Second World War coming to an end and the Marshall Aid sponsored by
the United States\textsuperscript{13}, the economy finally started to develop (Keyder, 1979:136). Agriculture, with a special emphasis from the Democrat Party and thanks to mechanization, became very profitable for landowners. However, the government’s economical actions which lacked planning were not able to stop the inflation from rising and the second half of the 1950s became catastrophic. In the 1960s and 1970s, the economic development plans which included more state intervention without hindering the private sectors had to be put into effect (Suğur, 1998:162).

A change in the social sphere of this era was the start of a massive wave of internal migration from the rural areas to major cities, especially to Istanbul. With the mechanization in the rural areas, the need for manpower in the fields had significantly decreased forcing people to move to the cities starting from the 1950s. However, as industrialization in the cities was not yet well developed, many of the migrants either had to work in temporary jobs or they were unemployed (Suğur, 1998:160). This period can be named as the period of rapid „de-peasantization” and slow „workerization” (Kiray, 1970). The democratization process initiated in this period led to growing politicization of Turkish society partially due to extended civil and political rights and freedoms granted by the 1961 Constitution. However, starting from the 1970s, Turkish society experienced intense political polarization and acts of political violence between the different factions left and the right groups. This period of political violence was ended by the military coup in 1980 (Özbudun, 2000:8).

In the international arena, the period of 1950-1980 was also a time when the relations with Europe gained speed. In 1959, shortly after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), Turkey made its first application to join the Community. In response to Turkey’s application, the EEC’s Council of Ministers’ suggested the establishment of an association with Turkey. The ensuing negotiations resulted with the signature of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. This agreement, which entered into force in 1964, marks the beginning of Turkey’s relations with EEC. The Ankara Agreement envisaged a progressive model of integration with Turkey, namely the establishment of a Customs Union composed of three phases; the „preparation phase”, the „transition phase” and the „final phase”. The first phase, which aimed to reduce economic differences between the parties, started in 1964, with the agreement’s entry into force. However, Turkey-EU relations entered a period of instability starting from the beginning of 1970s, until the second half of 1980s, due to Turkey’s internal political and economic conditions.

\textsuperscript{13} European Recovery Program funded by the United States (1947-1951) for rebuilding the economy of Europe is commonly referred to as the Marshall Plan.
Following the military intervention of 1980 in Turkey, the relations between Turkey and the Community virtually froze.\footnote{14}

In the period of 1950-1980, there were many bilateral labor agreements signed between Turkey and individual European countries. Thousands of „guest workers“ moved to the West through bilateral labor agreements.\footnote{15} With the economic stagnation of 1967 and the Oil Crisis in 1973, Western European countries hit hard by the crisis declared that there was no more need for migrant labor and they abolished all kinds of immigration for work purposes. Economic stagnation in Europe coupled with political turmoil in Turkey not only resulted in the nonimplementation of the timetable set for securing free movement of Turkish workers in the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which envisaged the year 1986 as the final date but even worse, it resulted in Member States erecting of new barriers (Kiriçi, 2008:192). A visa requirement was introduced first by Germany in 1980, to be followed by France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in an effort to curb further migratory flows from Turkey. What was supposed to be only a „temporary measure“ has been in force ever since. However, as we discuss in the Migration Section, the migration from Turkey to Europe has continued ever since by family reunification and asylum.

1980-2000

The military intervention of 1980 in Turkey had widespread impact throughout the country. During the three years of the military rule, political parties were banned and the followers of the right and the left were punished with arrests and imprisonments. In parallel with the globalization process, identity politics became an essential issue. While the concept of national identity was being challenged, religious (Yükleyen, 2008), ethnic (Bozarslan, 2008) and gender (Arat, 2008) based identity claims started to be voiced. The Islamic movement had a strong awakening in this period and it started turning into a strong player in the political field. In 1997, the secularist military gave a strict warning to the Islamic oriented Welfare Party\footnote{15} and in the following years, even though the Islamic movement lingered, political parties of this nature were closed by the Constitutional Court (Çduyuğ and Soyank, unpublished :1). Another issue high on the political agenda starting from this period was the armed clash between the Kurdish separatist group, PKK and the Turkish military. From the emergence of the PKK movement in 1984 to 1999, it is

\footnote{14} Turkey Secretariat General for EU Affairs (EUGS) website, \url{www.abgs.gov.tr}, view date: June 2010  \footnote{15} As explained in detail in the following Section on Migration.

\footnote{15} There existed other Islamic oriented political parties since 1960s, however, their electoral support had remained marginal until the Welfare Party.
estimated that forty thousand people died and three million people were displaced (Bozarslan, 2008: 352). This situation caused both internal and international mobility of Kurdish people in Turkey (Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies).

The years from 1980 to 2000 mark the transition to a neoliberal economy and the integration with the global economy. An outward looking, market-oriented strategy was adapted (Keyder and Buğra, 2005:25). This neoliberal economic model that was introduced in early 1980s introduced the convertibility of the currency and first privatization attempts. During this period of economic liberalization, Turkey experienced a rise in inflation and fluctuation of exchange rates. The Turkish economy failed to grow on a sustainable rate and negative growth rates were experienced during some years (UNDP, 2004:9). Turkey went through two major economic crises in 1994 and 2001. As a result, the IMF stepped in to assist the vulnerable Turkish economy.

In the social sphere, this period witnessed the rise of identity issues. The voicing of identity claims caused major sources of social tension such as the ongoing discomfort between the secularists and the Islamists that showed itself in the 1990s, with the emergence of the „headscarf issue“. In 1991, the Constitutional Court banned the entrance of female students with headscarves into the universities despite the belief of the Islamists who believed it is a fundamental right (Ġçduygu and Soyarık, unpublished: 2). Another identity claim belonged to the Kurds. The military regime, in early 1980s, had put a ban on all forms of expressions of Kurdishness and repressed Kurdish politicians (Bozarslan, 2008:350). This resulted in the radicalization of Kurdish movement and armed clashed between the PKK and the Turkish state started in 1984. The conflict situation in the Eastern and South Eastern regions of Turkey gave rise to forced migration and internal displacement of a predominantly Kurdish population to the major cities in the west in addition to asylum seeking abroad. A positive development related to the Kurdish Question was the lifting of the ban on the Kurdish language as a result of the EU accession process in 1990s.

The foreign relations gained speed in the period from 1980 to 2000, many steps were taken on the way to becoming a member of the EU. In 1986, Turkey stated its intention to apply for full membership and applied for it in 1987. Having completed the Customs Union in 1995, EU membership became one of the priority issues in Turkey’s agenda and Turkey attached particular importance to the EU's current enlargement process. The Helsinki European Council Summit held in 1999 marked a breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations. At the Helsinki Summit, Turkey was officially recognized without any precondition as a candidate state on an equal footing with other
candidate states. This recognition marked the beginning of a new era for Turkey-EU relations with a perspective of membership (Derviş et al., 2004:13-14).

Turkey had to continue facing the consequences of some serious internal problems in the international arena as well. The problems in the human rights records and the limited nature of fundamental freedoms were lingering as obstacles in the relations with the EU. In 1987, the Turkish government enabled individual applications to European Human Rights Commission and in 1989, it recognized the rulings of European Human Rights Courts as binding (Payaslioğlu and Gçduygu, 1999: 516). Still, the human rights records of Turkey throughout the 1990s involved cases of torture and physical abuse, death in custody and unsolved political killings (Payaslioğlu and Gçduygu, 1999: 516). The EU expressed in 1998 its concerns over the situation of the Kurdish minority in south-eastern Turkey since many of the violations of civil and political rights observed in the country were connected with this situation. After 1998, Turkey had made efforts to gradually introduce political and legal reforms and to ensure their effective implementation, in order to allow Turkish citizens to enjoy fundamental freedoms and human rights in line with European standards. But even though in following years the government undertook major steps to achieve better implementation of these reforms and significant progress took place also on the ground; the EU concluded that the implementation of the reforms remained uneven. Although human rights violations were diminishing, they continued to occur. The EU progress reports on Turkey demonstrated other problems in the fundamental rights. The freedom of expression and the press were not fully assured and freedom of association and assembly were subject to certain limitations (Turkey Regular Report, 1998; 1999).

2000- Present Day

The decade following 2000 has been a decade of ongoing transformation in the political, economic and social life in Turkey due to three factors: 1) the intensification of the Europeanization process, 2) the severe economic crisis in 2001, and 3) the majority rule of a single party government.

The financial crisis of 2001 seriously struck the Turkish economy and severely damaged the credibility of the legitimacy of the coalition government formed by parties from center left, center right and nationalist wings (Table 3)16. In the aftermath of the crisis, state-economy relations have been radically re-structured following recommendations by the IMF. Reforms were intended to found a stable economy in order to attract foreign investments to foster economic development

16 This coalition was led by Democratic Left Party under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. Other partners were Motherland Party from center right and Nationalist Action Party from right wing.
Within this context, the results of the 2002 elections reflected the discontent of the people with the existing political system and parties. All three parties constituting the coalition government failed to pass the 10 percent national threshold and were left outside the parliament. As a result a strong single party majority was created.

The winner of the elections was the AKP. The AKP received 34.2 percent of national votes but occupied 66 percent of seats in the parliament (Keyman and Öniğ, 2007:29). In the last elections held in 2007, the AKP further broadened its constituency by receiving almost 47 percent of popular votes and gained 341 seats in the parliament; while the opposition was represented in the parliament by the CHP with 112 seats, the MHP with 71 seats and 26 independently elected deputies affiliated with the DTP, the political representative of Kurdish identity politics (Table 4).

Although AKP was established in 2001 by politicians rooted and engaged in political Islam, it positioned itself within conservative democratic wing (Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009). AKP continued the IMF-led economic program and accelerated reform process towards EU accession. Just after the 2002 elections, the Copenhagen European Council Summit in December was yet another important turning point in the EU enlargement process. While the accession of ten candidate states to the EU was declared, the EU promised Turkey to give a date for the opening of accession process in December 2004, if the European Commission were to decide that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria by December 2004. In line with this decision, The Council took note of the resolute steps taken by Turkey in pursuing a comprehensive reform process and decided to open accession negotiations on October 3, 2005.

In the accession negotiations, so far, thirteen chapters have been opened, and only one chapter (Science and Research) has been provisionally closed. Currently, the negotiation process is evidently moving at a slow pace, a tardiness that is enhanced by the decision of the European Council in 2006 to not open negotiations in eight chapters until the situation in Cyprus is resolved, and not to allow for the provisional closure of any remaining chapters. Furthermore, the contradictory and negative statements issued by some EU political leaders, public support both

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17 Justice and Development Party  
18 Republican People’s Party  
19 National Action Party  
20 Democratic Society Party  
21 The party is currently organized under the name BDP, Peace and Democracy Party after the closing down of DTP by Constitutional Court in December 2009.
in Turkey (with regards to EU membership), and in the EU (with regards to the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the Union) has been seriously impaired.

Despite current challenges towards full membership, the Europeanization process since 2000 led to significant improvements in civil rights regarding ethnic and religious minorities and generated an important undercurrent for the normalization of the position of the military in the political system. However, problems concerning minority rights especially related to unresolved Kurdish Question continue to be the focus of severe criticisms by the EU. Only in 2008, the EU acknowledged that Turkey had made limited progress on ensuring respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with European standards. Still some significant further efforts were required, in particular on the use of languages other than Turkish in broadcasting, in political life and when accessing public services (Turkey 2008 Progress Report). In 2009 the EU concluded that Turkey had made limited efforts to enhance tolerance or promote inclusiveness vis-à-vis minorities. A debate on minority-related issues had developed in the country, publicized by AKP under the name „democratic initiative”. However, Turkey’s approach to minority rights remained restrictive. Full respect for and protection of language, culture and fundamental rights, in accordance with European standards had yet to be fully achieved (Turkey 2009 Progress Report). Although certain positive steps have been made since 1998 as regards human rights, in 2009 there were still problems in Turkey that gave cause for concern regarding negative as well positive rights such as gender and regional disparities in political participation, economic participation and access to education. The establishment of a Parliamentary Commission on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women is a positive step on implementation of gender equality measures. Limited efforts were made within Europeanization and globalization context with regard to asylum and migration issues as will be explained in the Migration Section.

From 2002 onwards, the Turkish economy went through a major transformation with IMF-led structural changes and the liberalization of its financial markets and it became one of the most dynamic economies in Europe (Ğçduygû, 2009:5). This was coupled by remarkable annual growth rates in GDP (6.2 percent in 2002, 5.3 percent in 2003, 9.4 percent in 2004, 8.4 percent in 2005, 6.9 percent in 2006). GDP growth rate in 2007 declined to 4.5 percent. Even a sharper decline in the GDP growth rate occurred in 2008 when the Turkish economy grew only by 0.9 percent. In the period of 2008-2009, Turkey was confronted with the inevitable negative consequences of the worldwide economic crisis, and the economy shrank to a -4.9 percent growth rate.

During the last decade, the inflation rate measured as consumer price index significantly declined from 57 percent in 2002, to 10.1 percent in 2008. The exchange rate has been fluctuating since
the 2001 devaluation. Following the impact of the 2008 financial crises, a considerable devaluation of new Turkish Lira against US Dollar caused it to fall as low as 1US$ to 1.6 Turkish Lira. Contrasting with the positive developments in the economy from 2002 onwards, the stability of Turkey’s economy has been weakened by the heavy debt burden, relatively high interest rates and high levels of public deficit. The figures hint at the fact that the negative impacts of foreign and domestic debt problems are likely to continue to impact on the overall economic performance (Çöduygu, 2009:5-6).

Given the long term instability of the economy, the Turkish labor market continued to experience serious problems. Unemployment and underemployment which exceeded 2.5 million and reached to 700,000 respectively in 2008, out of a 24 million economically active population, has been a major socio-economic problem in Turkey (Çöduygu, 2009:6). The Turkish labor market is characterized by an ever-declining yet still considerable portion of labor force in agricultural sector, a growing informal sector intertwined with the formal sector (Keyder and Buğra, 2005:25), and a low female labor force participation. Although an Employment Package was adopted in May 2008 aiming to address unemployment challenges, and with a specific focus on the promotion of job opportunities for women, young people and people with disabilities, the situation in the labor market remains challenging and policy responses have been limited (Turkey 2007 Progress Report: 30).

In its 2009 Progress Report the European Commission also states that Turkey made only limited progress in the field of social policy and employment. The legislation on labor law, health and safety at work and on anti-discrimination was not in line with EU standards. There had been no progress towards achieving full trade union rights in line with EU standards and ILO Conventions, particularly with regard to the right to organize, the right to strike and the right to bargain collectively, for either the private or public sectors. The principle of anti-discrimination, on the other hand, was enshrined in the Constitution and upheld with changes in new Constitution.

Perceptions on Europe

As a result of the slow pace of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, the percentage of respondents who believe that EU membership is a “good thing” in Turkey has decreased from 55 percent in September 2005 to 45 percent according to Eurobarometer survey in 2009. Along the same lines,
European support for Turkey’s accession to the EU has decreased from 31 percent in September 2005 to 28 percent in 2006 (lower than the support for Croatia, Albania and Ukraine).\(^{22}\)

The Eurobarometer surveys reveal that the percentage of Turkish people who viewed Turkey’s EU membership as a positive thing fell from 71 percent in 2004 to 49 percent in 2008. In 2008, 58 percent of the Turkish population believed that EU membership will be beneficial for Turkey. The opposite view relies on various reasons, such as categorical opposition to EU membership, Turkey not needing the EU, fear of loss of sovereignty, of slowdown in economic growth and of a negative impact on democracy.

Judging by the Eurobarometer surveys, the image of the EU has actually become more positive in time from 43 percent in 2005 to 49 percent in 2008. When it comes to the question of ‘What does EU mean to you’, in Turkey, the majority of the responses focuses on economic well-being (37 percent), the four fundamental freedoms of persons, capital, services and goods (22 percent), democracy (22 percent), peace (16 percent), social security (16 percent). The answers are followed by loss of cultural identity (13 percent) as well as cultural diversity (10 percent). On the other hand, among the EU-27 respondents, the EU is associated more with the four freedoms (49 percent), the euro (35 percent), peace (26 percent), being a power centre in the world (22 percent), whereas economic well-being (17 percent) and social security (9 percent) are not prioritized.\(^{23}\)

According to the findings of a different study carried out by the German Marshall Fund in 2008 entitled „Transatlantic Trends“\(^{24}\), 55 percent of Turkish respondents believe that Turkey has such different values that it is not really part of the West, with the highest agreement in Germany (76 percent), France (58 percent) and Italy (61 percent). Concerning Turkey’s EU membership, 42 percent of the Turkish respondents view it as a good thing and 45 percent of the Europeans view it as neither a good nor a bad thing. What is more striking to point out is that 60 percent of Europeans think it is likely that Turkey will join the EU, while 48 percent for Americans and only 26 percent of Turkish respondents believe in Turkey joining the EU.

This loss of faith in the EU membership can be best explained by the „accession fatigue“ prevailing in Turkish society unlike the „accession mood“ in other candidate or potential candidate countries.

\(^{22}\) Standard Eurobarometer 66 Autumn 2006  
\(^{23}\) Standard Eurobarometer 70, Autumn 2008  
\(^{24}\) Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2008 by German Marshall Fund of the United States and Compagnia di San Paolo. www.transatlantictrends.org
An associate member with the EU since 1963, having completed the Customs Union in 1995 and a negotiating country since 2005, Turkey still lacks a definite target date. Thus, the widespread belief among the Turkish public is that even if Turkey fulfills all the criteria, its membership might still be blocked for political reasons.  

Migration

General Migration History

During the first half of the 20th century, the history of the Republic of Turkey was characterized by international migratory movements. In the context of nation-building, policies pursued by the newly established Republic led to massive emigration of its non-Muslim population. Simultaneously, the Republic of Turkey welcomed the immigration of Muslim and Turkic populations living outside of the nation-state borders in neighboring countries. Apart from this ethnic and religious based

25 This perception is not entirely ungrounded as the Eurobarometer surveys reveal in national country reports. For instance, in France, 71 percent oppose Turkish membership, while only 19 percent support it. And only 35 percent of the French would support Turkey’s accession if Turkey were to meet all the required criteria. Likewise in Austria, seven percent are in favor Turkey’s EU accession and 85 percent are against it. The Austrians would not change their mind even if Turkey were to fulfill the necessary EU criteria (79 percent against, 16 percent in favor).
population movements which can be analyzed within the context of the nation-building process, migratory movements from Turkey to other countries were limited until the 1960s.

This Section focuses on post-1960 migration history of Turkey, initially characterized by labor emigration to Western European countries from 1961 until mid-1970s. Today, Western Europe continues to be the main destination for emigrants from Turkey. From the 1970s onwards, despite the restrictions of European countries on regular labor migration to Western European countries, the population of Turkish citizens in Europe increased through migration based on family reunification and asylum. In addition, after the oil crisis of 1970s, new destinations for labor migration emerged such as Middle Eastern and North African countries, as well as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1989. By the late 2000s, over 3 million Turkish citizens were residing abroad and 2.7 million of them were based in European countries. Germany, where almost 2 million Turkish citizens reside, is the major destination for emigrants from Turkey, followed by France, the Netherlands and Austria (Table 5). Approximately six percent of the country’s population lives in other countries.

On the other hand, after 1980s, interlinked to the European migration system, Turkey has become a country of immigration and a transit migration country as well as an emigration country. Within this period, the country experienced sizable asylum seekers flows from Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan as well as flows of asylum from African countries. These movements are coupled with clandestine transit migration oriented to Europe and irregular and circular labor migration from neighboring countries and the CIS into Turkey.

**Emigration from Turkey**

*Massive Labor Migration to Western Europe (1961-1974)*

Following the Second World War, the European migration regime was based on the demand for labor from neighbouring countries. Such external demands were incorporated in Turkey’s development strategy. The First Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967) endorsed the export of the surplus labor force to fight with unemployment and benefit from in-flow remittances (TÜSGAD, 2006:63). With this aim, Turkey signed the first bilateral labor recruitment agreement with Federal Germany followed by bilateral agreements with Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium in 1964, France in 1965, Sweden and Australia in 1967. Less comprehensive agreements were made with

The number of workers going to Europe increased immediately after 1961, and peaked at 66,000 departures in 1964. Then, the recession of 1966-1967 caused a rapid decline in these numbers. In 1967, only nine thousand workers were sent by the Turkish Employment service, while over 900,000 were on the waiting list to go abroad. In the aftermath of recession, the number of emigrants increased sharply. This was a period of mass emigration: more than 100,000 workers left Turkey annually (TÜSGAD, 2006:63). This regular flow of migrant workers eventually ended in 1975, because of the economic hardship that Western European governments went through after the Oil Crisis. Official figures in Turkey indicate that almost 800,000 migrant workers were sent to Europe within the period of 1961-1974 through the intermediary of the Turkish Employment Office (Table 10). Accordingly, 81 percent of migrant workers were sent to Germany, seven percent to France, five percent to Austria and three percent to the Netherlands (TÜSGAD, 2006:63). The demographic characteristics of migration workers in this early emigration period reveal the link between internal and international migration. Based on limited statistics provided by the Turkish Employment Office, it is estimated that one third of the migrant workers who emigrated from Turkey within this period, originated from three metropolitan areas; Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir. Although there were some city-born skilled workers among early emigrants, most of them were rural born unskilled workers who had first migrated to large cities and then emigrated to Western Europe (NIDI, 1999:50).

Apart from these three large cities, other major cities contributing to earlier phase of emigration were Afyon, Eskişehir, Konya, Yozgat, Kayseri, Sivas, Nevşehir in the central region, Denizli, Balıkesir, Sakarya, Bursa, Kütahya, Manisa, Uşak from Western region, Adana, Hatay from Southern region, Samsun, Trabzon, Zonguldak from Northern region. It should be underlined that emigrants from South-Eastern region made up less than 2 percent of all emigrants in this period (NIDI, 1999:50). The ratio of women workers" sent by the Turkish Employment Office is estimated at 20 percent of all workers recruited by European countries (Kirişçi and Avci, 2006:144).

Post-1974 Emigration from Turkey

Continuing Emigration to Europe

Despite the fact that the intake of regular migrant workers by Western European governments almost totally ceased in 1975, the number of Turkish citizens residing abroad—mainly in European countries—continued to increase. In other words, immigrants admitted on guestworkers schemes settled permanently in these countries by acquiring permanent resident or citizenship status in their host countries. Within established migration culture and networks, emigration to European countries continued through 1) asylum applications, 2) family reunification and 3) clandestine labor migration (NIDI, 1999:xvi).

As a consequence, Europe remained a target destination for emigrants from Turkey. The number of Turkish citizens living in Europe reached almost two million in the 1980s and 2.9 million in the mid-1990. This number decreased to 2.7 million in 2000, yet remained stable throughout the 2000s. However, the decrease is mostly due to immigrants of Turkish origin who were naturalized in their host countries (TÜSGAD, 2006:66; Table 6).

The considerable increase in the number of Turkish migrants is due to the arrival of family members of the initial migrants by means of permanent residence permits or by applying for family reunification. Family reunification through marriage migration is a prominent form of migration especially for female migrants (NIDI, 1999:46). As expected, male migrants, irrespective of their irregular/regular status are more likely to migrate for economic reasons (NIDI, 1999:87).

After the 1980 military coup, a considerable number of people sought political refuge in Europe. Western European countries have received large numbers of asylum applications from Turkey which constituted more than two-fifths of those who migrated to Europe from Turkey between 1981 and 2005 (Table 7). Considering that the emigration from Eastern and South Eastern regions inhabited by Kurdish population increased in this period, the number of asylum applications to Europe skyrocketed in the wake of the ongoing Kurdish Question, and the majority of these asylum seekers are presumed to be Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin (TÜSGAD, 2006:67; NIDI, 1999:51). Accordingly, the annual number of asylum seekers from Turkey to Europe increased considerably from 10,000 in the early 1980s to 40,000 towards the end of the decade (TÜSGAD, 2006:67). The figure of 30,000 at the end of 1990s, steadily decreased from 2000 onwards to as low as under 7,000 in 2008 (Çoduγu, 2009:10).

Asylum is also used as an entry strategy into Europe for those who migrate for economic reasons. Therefore, it is hard to distinguish “genuine” political refugees from economic migrants. Asylum flows are articulated within established migration networks and heavily depend on established
migrant communities. As a result, European countries are the main destination of asylum seekers from Turkey (Table 7, Gençduygu, 2009:10). From 1983 to 1994, top destinations for asylum from Turkey were Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, UK, and Sweden (NIDI, 1999:47-48, Table 8). The UK became a significant country of asylum for Turkish citizens from Kurdish origin from 1989 onwards. While in 1999, Germany was receiving over half of all the asylum applications from Turkey to Europe, France gradually became a major country of asylum after 2000s. In 2005 and 2006, applications to France constituted over 30 percent of all asylum applications from Turkey whereas Germany received only around a quarter of them ( Gençduygu, 2009:10-11).

Apart from asylum and migration related to family, clandestine migration into Europe increased as well in post-1974 period. The illegal component in this type of migration refers to: 1) illegal entries into the receiving country, 2) overstaying after legal entries on tourist visas and 3) rejected asylum seekers (NIDI, 1999:46). 27 It is difficult to accurately estimate the size of undocumented or clandestine migration from Turkey. Nevertheless, based on the numbers of apprehended cases, there seems to be a decline in clandestine migration from 2004 onwards (Gençduygu, 2009:11). 28

The nature of migration from Turkey to Europe has changed considerably with regard to gender, forms of entry and status of immigrants in Europe. A similar change also occurred in their places of origin. After the 1980s, the number of cities and counties contributing to emigration from Turkey expanded and emigration flows spread to Eastern and South Eastern Regions which had only marginally contributed to emigration in the earlier period (NIDI, 1999:50). However, emigration from these regions is more associated with asylum and clandestine migration than family reunification or marriage migration.

According to the NIDI report, top destinations in Europe for 95 percent of immigrants originating from Turkey were: Germany, Austria, Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, UK, Denmark, and Norway (NIDI, 1999:47, Table 9).

Non-European Destinations for Labor Migration

Another change in the nature of emigration patterns from Turkey was in the direction of the labor migration due to the Oil Crisis, the economic stagnation and the closure of the European borders. The signing of the workforce agreement with the Australian government in 1967 concretely

27 It should be noted that only one tenth of applications from Turkey are granted refugee status (TÜSİAD, 2006:70).
28 This figure dropped from 2350 in 2004 to 1788 in 2007 (İçduygu, 2009:11).
revealed a deliberate strategy the Turkish government is in search for destinations other than Europe. Within this context, Middle Eastern and North African countries from mid-1970s onwards, and the CIS from 1990s onwards have been destinations for contract labor migration. In addition, particularly since 1980s, there is a growing trend of brain-drain from Turkey (Kiriçi, 2008:191-192). This population movement includes scholars, university graduates and university students seeking study and job opportunities in the traditional migrant receiving countries of the United States, Canada, and Australia (Akçapar, 2009).

Middle East and North Africa

In the post-1974 period, the emigration movement from Turkey shifted to the oil exporting countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Following the rise of the oil prices in 1973, oil exporting Arab countries such as Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia, demanded workers from other developing countries. This demand coincided with Turkey’s aim to find new destinations to export its surplus labor (TÜSGAD, 2006: 65). Approximately 75,000 workers were sent to Arab countries in 1975-1980. This figure rose to more than 400,000 in the following decade (Table 10). These male dominant labor flows continued to increase until the Gulf Crisis yet from 1990s onwards, the labor demand decreased by half due to the completion of infrastructural projects in these countries (Çduygu, 1999:41). The annual figure of those sent to Middle Eastern and North African countries by the Turkish Employment Office decreased to less 10,000 between 2000 and 2005, but increased again to nearly 40,000 in 2006 and over 25,000 in 2008 (Çduygu, 2009:31). Although Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq received more than 60 percent of the labor migration to the region in 2008, it is hard to identify a pattern in terms of top destinations because of the fluctuating and short term nature of contract-dependent labor migration flows to Middle Eastern and North African countries.

Commonwealth of Independent States

In the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, re-structuring programs were initiated in the newly-emerging countries, and project-based and work related migratory movement to the CIS formed the last stage of the migration directed from Turkey to other countries. This created another wave of contract-dependent labor migration due to the involvement of Turkish companies in the reconstruction programs (Çduygu, 1999:41). It is recorded that over 65,000 workers took up jobs in the CIS between 1996 and 2000 and over 90,000 between 2001 and 2005 (TÜSGAD, 2006: 66).
Although the official figure recorded by the Turkish Employment Office has steadily increased between 2000 and 2007, a sharp decline occurred from 36,000 in 2007 to around 19,500 in 2008 (Çöduyg, 2009:31). This is supposedly due to the financial crisis considering the overall decline in number of workers sent abroad by Turkish Employment Office. The top destination in this cluster is Russia followed by Kazakhstan (Çöduyg, 2009:12).

Return Migration

Although emigration from Turkey to Europe continued even after European countries ended the recruitment of migrant labor from Turkey, return migration was always part of this process just as temporary guest worker schemes imply (NIDI, 1999:48-49). Although it is difficult to make accurate estimations on the numbers of return migrants, it can be argued that „Return Acts and Bonuses“ granted by host countries encouraged return migration in early 1980s. While annual returnees never exceeded 60,000 annually before 1980 (Gitmez, 1983:113), the number of returnees from Germany only reached 310,000 in 1983-1984 period but sharply declined to 37,000 annually towards the end of the decade (NIDI, 1999: 49). Overall, it is estimated that 1.5 million emigrants including rejected asylum seekers returned to Turkey between 1980 and 1999 (TÜŞGAD, 2006:70).

As a result of intensified emigration process from 1960s onwards, migrant groups from Turkey are present in many countries of the world, although Europe remained the main destination. Considering that approximately six percent of the population of Turkey is living abroad, the emigration experience in Turkey is likely to include a wider percentage including return migrants and left behind families of migrants.

Immigration into Turkey

Regarding immigration, fundamental changes in the characteristics of immigrants in Turkey from 1980 onwards, led to the transformation of Turkey into a country of immigration and transit while emigration continued (Erder, 2003). Arrival of Iranian asylum seekers fleeing from the Iranian Revolution in 1979 was the first symbolic sign yet not the only evidence for changing immigration dynamics in Turkey. These first immigration flows into Turkey were followed by the arrival of other refugee groups such as the mass entry of refugees from Iraq in 1988, 1990 and 1991 (Kaya, 2009) coupled with an increasing number of labor migrants (circular and overstayers), transit migrants, and regular migrants entering the country from neighboring or nearby countries in the region (Kiriğiç, 2008b). Recently, as a result of globalization and positive economic
developments, Turkey has also started to receive professionals and retirees from the western world (TÜSGAD, 2006:71).

Types of immigration into Turkey can be analyzed in three broad categories: asylum, irregular and regular migration flows (Table 11). Irregular migration is further divided into two types which are irregular labor migration and irregular transit migration (TÜSGAD, 2006: 72). These categories are not mutually exclusive taking into account that there is a thin line between regularity and irregularity.

Asylum Migration

Since the 1980s, Turkey has generated asylum seekers to Europe yet it is also a transit country for asylum seekers coming from Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Turkey remains one of the few countries not lifting the geographical limitation (Kiriçi, 1996:293) of the 1951 UN Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the country does not offer a permanent refugee status to asylum seekers from non-European countries which constitute overwhelming majority of asylum seekers in Turkey (Keyman and İçduygu, 2000:391). After legal changes in 1994, non-Europeans are eligible to apply for temporary asylum in Turkey before they are resettled in third countries (MIUMTIE Country Report on Turkey, 2009:18\(^{29}\)). Hence, Turkey has become a bridge for the asylum seekers who wish to reach Europe, Australia, Canada and the US (TÜSGAD, 2006:74).

Numerically speaking, 24,000 asylum applications were made to Turkey between 1997 and 2005. The annual number of 6,000 asylum applications in late 1990s decreased to 4,000 in mid2000s and increased to 7,000 in 2007 and 13,000 in 2008 (İçduygu, 2009:43; Figure 1).

Irregular Migration

Turkey, standing at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa, has become a transit country for all the migrants who, -in search of better life chances- aim to reach EU countries. Moreover, Turkey’s geo-strategic location between immigrant-producing areas and Europe coupled with extensive land borders and coastlines and a large share of the informal economy makes it a transit zone for migration flows.

Within this context, Turkey receives heavy flows of irregular migrants including those who enter, reside in or depart from Turkey without the necessary documents such as passports, residence and/or work permits (MIUMTIE, 2009:9). While the apprehended irregular migrants make up a quarter of the migration flow into Turkey, their actual number can be estimated as double or triple of the visible number (MIUMTIE, 2009:9 and TÜSGAD, 2006:72, Table 11). Based on the top-10 apprehended cases, major source countries for irregular migration into Turkey are Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Moldova, and Iran (Figure 2). The IOM Report on Turkey indicates that Turkey is also a destination country of human trafficking in the Black Sea Region (IOM, 2008).

Irregular Transit Migration

One form of irregular movement is the migration from Asia, Africa and the Middle East to Europe through Turkey. Between 1995 and 2008, over 750,000 irregular migrants were apprehended. Those coming from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Mauritania, Somalia and Syria make up more than 50 percent of these cases. Transit migrants enter Turkey intentionally through legal/illegal means or unintentionally, when they are deceived by human smugglers (Çduygu, 2004:24).

With the EU accession negotiations and the pressure from the EU, there has been an improvement in the border controls and punishments for human smuggling were made harsher. Both factors have arguably led to a decrease in the number of transit migrants (TÜSGAD, 2006:74). The annual figure indicates that apprehended cases decreased from around 100,000 in the early 2000s to 50,000 nowadays (TÜSGAD, 2006:73). Research indicates that Van (Çduygu and ToktaĢ, 2002), Istanbul (DanıĢ et.al., 2006) and the Aegean Coast (MIUMTIE, 2009:17) are crucial loci for transit migration.

Irregular Labor Migration

Migrants, who usually enter legally but overstay, are generally temporarily employed in sectors such as domestic work, sex work, entertainment, textile, construction and tourism (TÜSGAD, 2006:74). Irregular labor migration is highly feminized as there are more jobs in Turkey in the sectors of entertainment, domestic work and textile for women, rather than for men (MIUMTIE, 2009:15). Since the year 2000, however, there has been a decline in the number of Eastern European migrants due to the economic crisis resulting in unemployment in Turkey and the free movement right granted for Eastern Europeans due to the latest EU enlargement (TÜSGAD,
Most of research on irregular migration focuses on Istanbul assuming that a considerable portion of irregular migrants work there.

**Regular Migration**

The term „regular migrants“ refers to those entering, residing in or departing from the country with valid documents (MIUMTIE, 2009:9). According to the Directorate of Security, of the 175,000 residence permits granted to foreigners in Turkey in 2008, 19,000 were for work, 29,000 for study, and 127,000 were granted for other purposes. The regular migration into Turkey is characterized by a number of flows. One flow is the migration from the Former Soviet Union countries, the Balkans and the Middle East. Within this high flow of regular migrants, a considerable portion is made up of ethnic-Turkish foreign nationals most of whom come to study, work or join relatives or friends based on the 1934 Law on Settlement that encourages Turkish speaking populations to come to Turkey (MIUMTIE, 2009:14). Other groups in the regular migration flow are the EU citizens of Turkish origin who gave up their Turkish citizenship, the US and EU nationals who receive residence permits in Turkey, foreign students coming to Turkey under the 1992 Grand Student Project and lastly, the retirees, mostly from the EU, who buy property in Turkey (MIUMTIE, 2009:12-13).

**Migration Policies and Discourses**

**Emigration Policies and Discourses in Turkey**

As stated above, Turkey’s emigration policy embedded within nation-building project in the first half of the 20th century was replaced by economic concerns framed within the development paradigm between 1960s and 1980s. The main strategy was based on bilateral agreements with industrialized countries in order to export surplus labor and benefit from workers’ remittances in foreign currency, which constituted a major input to Turkey’s economy since 1960 but which gradually lost their importance. Although the share of remittances in the GNP never exceeded 3.6 percent, they have been an important source to cover trade deficits. Only after 2003, their ratio to trade deficits became marginal and fluctuated around 2 percent (Table 12). The underlying development discourses were that guest-workers in Europe would come back as skilled workers and contribute to industrialization in Turkey (Çengiz, 2009:22; Kirişçi and Avci, 2006:142). In it, emigration of labor migrants was expected to be a temporary phenomenon in the eyes of Turkish authorities as well as their European counterparts. After 1980s, the emigration and reliance on
remittances ceased to be a major economic strategy in Turkey which embraced a liberal economy with export-led growth strategy.

Regarding the policies towards Turkish citizens abroad, almost no attempts were made to facilitate the process of integration of returning migrant workers and their families except for limited attempts during the 1970-1980 period such as the establishment of schools teaching German as a foreign language for migrants" children returning to Turkey from Germany or not levying taxes on returning workers" household or entrepreneurial purchases. Three major programs were initiated in this period in order to channel workers" remittances into employment generating investments. One form was the „workers” joint stock companies". The second form was the village development cooperatives which were based on the return migrants” savings. Thirdly, in order to attract the migrant savings, the State Industry and Worker Investment Bank was established in 1975. These initiatives, however, were not successful enough to promote even development across the country (Ççduygu, 2006:11).

From the 1980s onwards, migrant belongings in the diaspora are constructed around identities other than the officially endorsed Turkish identity such as Kurdish, Islam, Alewite identities, have been a source of anxiety for the Turkish government (Kiriçci and Avci, 2006:125). Mobilizations based on such identities have had an influence on the existing conflicts in Turkish politics. A major policy response on this matter has been to send out teachers and religious officials to provide services for migrants abroad. Other policy responses with the aim of preserving bonds with migrants abroad included the paid option to perform much shorter periods of military service (which is obligatory for male Turkish citizens), the recognition of dual-citizenship in 1981 (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2007; Ççduygu and Sert, forthcoming), and the granting of political and social rights to migrants who had left Turkish citizenship to become citizens in their country of residence. The latter practice is labeled „pink card” in the media and public discourse. Currently, there are two official bodies directly responsible for issues concerning migrants abroad. These are; 1) The Directorate of Turks Living Abroad, Migration, Asylum and Property, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 2) the External Relations and Services Abroad under the Ministry of Labor (IOM, 2008:27).
Despite the shift in the official perspective towards migration, emigration to Europe continued to be a salient theme in movies and literature. During 1970s and 1980s, several movies depicting the lives of Turkish immigrants abroad and their return were filmed. The movies focused on migrants’ perceptions of Europe and European life style and discrepancies between their social status abroad and in Turkey. Germany is the main scene in these movies which also reflect general perceptions and attitudes towards emigrants in Turkey who are called by non-migrant people as „Almancı“ or „Alamancı“ literally meaning Turks living in Germany. The word „Almancı“ connotes a particular status referring to migrant workers from peasant background who have gained economic capital by working abroad, yet who lack social capital. Meanwhile, there is evidence that migration led to social mobility of migrant workers and to –albeit limited- changes in the status of women within family relations (Abadan-Unat, 1977; Kadioğlu, 1994; Day and Ğçduygu, 1997). Another study conducted in late 1980s by Martin (1991) indicates that return migrants are more familiar to notions such as democracy and human rights than non-migrants.

Considering that most migrants from Turkey became permanent residents in European countries, there is the simultaneous prevalence of two conflicting official perspectives towards former or current Turkish citizens abroad. The tension arises between the view advocating the preservation of cultural bonds with migrants abroad as much as possible and the view supporting their adaptation and integration to the countries in which they currently reside. In the last decade, Euro-Turks, a rather heterogeneous group, settled in several countries of Europe have been the focus of academic research (Kentel and Kaya, 2005). On the one hand, their success stories in European political parties gain media

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30 Examples include comedies such as “Gubetçi Şaban” (“Şaban from Germany”) (1985); “Katma Değer Şaban”, (“Şaban, the Value Added”) (1985) and also dramas such as “Sarı Mercedes” (“Mercedes, My love”) (1987) based on the novel by Adalet Ağaoğlu entitled “Fikrimin İnce Gülü” (1977). The experiences of second/ third generation migrants are the focus of more recent movies such as “Lola und Bilitikid” (“Lola and Billy the Kid”) (1999) and “Gegen die Wand” (“Head on”) (2005).
coverage. On the other hand, Euro-Turks are expected to lobby for Turkey”s EU membership and for protecting Turkey”s interest in Europe.

In recent years, Turkey –at least at the discursive level- has started to display positive attitudes towards the integration of its citizens abroad in their host countries in terms of their socialization and enjoyment of their political rights. Based on their experience with ongoing migration flows from Turkey into Europe, European countries are concerned with Turkey”s EU membership with the fear of mass flows from Turkey. Turkey, in response to such concerns, relies on the demographic complementarity argument and contends that Turkey”s young population will complement the work force needed due to the aging population of Europe (TUSIAD, 2006:101103).

Immigration Policies and Discourses in Turkey

As Turkey does not officially admit to be a country of immigration (Güdüz and Biehl, 2008:2), it lacks a coherent, systematic legislation on immigration to respond to the „new population movements” (Güzel and Bayram, 2007:203). Laws and regulations concerning immigration have been reshaped, though in a jeopardized fashion, after a long period of indifference between 1934 and 1994. 1994-2001 was a period of reaction, specifically in the realm of asylum. From 2001 onwards, the EU accession process has been the major anchor leading to hot debates on the transformations of immigration policies in Turkey (MIUMTIE, 2009:21).

Within the context of nation-state building in the Early Republican era, the migration and asylum policies were primarily based on the settlement of migrants with „Turkish culture and descent” to Turkey. The 1934 Settlement Law (although put into a new form in 2006) crystallizing this „ethnic kin” approach still determines the rules concerning who can migrate and settle in Turkey (Güdüz et al, 2009:245). Other than the Settlement Law, major legislation regulating immigration into Turkey are the Passport Law concerning Turkey"s visa regimes applied to foreigners, the Citizenship Law regulating the naturalization processes, the law regulating domicile and employment status of foreigners within Turkish borders and the 1951 Geneva Convention concerning the status of asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey. Currently, there are various state bodies, simultaneously responsible of policies concerning immigration. The most prominent of them are; 1) Department of Foreigners, Border and Asylum under Directorate of

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31 For instance, Cem Ozdemir, a third generation migrant from Turkey, co-chair of Green Party in Germany is a public figure in Turkey.

After the 1980s, the migration policies adopted in the early years of the Republic fell short to respond to new migration movements, which were characterized by the arrival of non-European refugees and economic migrants. This context where Turkey is characterized as a transit as well as a host country for various regular and irregular population movements, calls for the processes of transformation of the old migration policies. This situation led to legal changes which are interlinked to EU accession process as well as Turkey”s changing immigration dynamics.

From 1994 to 2001, major developments in migration policies occurred in the realm of asylum. As Turkey remains one of few countries not lifting the geographical limitation in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Kiriçi, 1996:293), the country does not offer a permanent refugee status to asylum seekers from non-European countries which constitute overwhelming majority of asylum seekers in Turkey (Keyman and Ççduygu, 2000:391). The 1994 regulation pertaining to the asylum seekers (Ççduygu and Kiriçi, 2009:1617) introduced the temporary asylum status which had not existed before. This granted asylum seekers the „right to temporarily reside in Turkey” and strict administrative regulations on asylum seekers were softened in late 1990s due to international criticism (Kiriçi, 1996). Currently, the UNHCR as well as the Ministry of Interior receive and process temporary asylum applications in Turkey.

The temporary status of asylum seekers in Turkey to be resettled in third countries after the approval of their asylum applications is subject to criticisms on the part of the EU. The EU no longer willing to accept political refugees requires burden sharing from Turkey in managing asylum flows (Ççduygu, 2003). The divergent discourses in the realm of asylum in Turkey reflect the dilemma between pressures towards Europeanization and the fear of a boom in asylum applications to Turkey. In this sense, changes in asylum policies are likely to stay an amalgam of old-fashioned asylum law of Turkey and a full alignment with the EU Acquis until Turkey”s full membership to the EU (Kaya, 2009; Ççduygu, 2007; Kiriçi, 2003).

Other major policy developments within the context of Europeanization and internal dynamics of the country include; a limited alignment of visa requirements with Schengen”s negative visa list, new clauses introduced to the Penal Code regarding human trafficking and changes made in the

\textsuperscript{32} http://www.egm.gov.tr/daire.yabancilar.asp, view date: July 2010
\textsuperscript{33} http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa, view date: July 2010
legal status of foreigners and in the Citizenship Law (Ģçduygu et. al., 2009:246-247). On the one hand, Turkey started to issue visas to several countries in the Schengen’s negative visa list such as Kazakhstan, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman (IOM, 2008:42). On the other hand, Turkey’s already liberal visa regime was further relaxed with countries such as Syria (as of October 2009), Georgia (as of February 2006), Lebanon (as of January 2010), Jordan (as of December 2009) and Russia (as of May 2010) in parallel to the changes in Turkey’s foreign policies. These developments do not only contradict with the Schengen requirements, but also reveal that officials in Turkey are inclined to consider the full alignment with Schengen only after Turkey’s full membership to the EU.

Conforming the Palermo Protocol against Trafficking in Persons, the definition of trafficking and smuggling in human beings was introduced into the Turkish Penal Code and the act of trafficking was criminalized (Ģçduygu, 2009:11). In addition, the International Organization for Migration has established the „157 hotline“ to provide help for victims of human trafficking since 2005 (IOM, 2008:46).

The Law on Work Permits for Foreigners came into force in September 2003. It eased the access to working permits in line with international standards, but also favored the access for „pink card“ holders over „real“ foreign citizens (Lordoğlu, 2007:102). Unlike previous laws, the changes allowed foreign workers to practice all professions (Ģçduygu, 2009:12). As a consequence, an increase is likely to be observed in those granted working permit in Turkey. However, it is also true that the demands for work permits mostly come from professionals and high skilled workers and the number of permits granted to unskilled workers such as domestic workers is only marginal (Lordoğlu, 2007:104).

Before the amendment of the Article 5 of the Citizenship Law in June 2003, foreign women could immediately acquire citizenship after marrying a Turkish national, while foreign men were subject to longer procedures. The legal changes were made to require the marriage to continue for three years to be eligible for naturalization in order to prevent arranged marriages. It also standardized...
women’s and men’s acquisition of citizenship. In addition, under the new law, children of mixed parents (one Turkish, one foreigner) are granted Turkish citizenship.

Immigration in Turkey covers only a marginal place in public discourse and media. Rather than raising public awareness, the media tends to reinforce stereotypical image of migrants: while African asylum seekers and/or transit migrants are seen as dangerous drug dealers (Brewer and Yükseler, 2006), migrant women from post-Soviet countries are represented as “prostitutes”. In fact, the Russian name „Natasha“ has become synonymous to migrant sex worker in Turkey (Gülçür and İlkkaracan, 2002). Taking into account the treatment of migrants by the police and the society, one can argue that a particular type of xenophobia and racism – though different from manifestations of anti-immigrant feelings in Europe- has been taking place in Turkey. Especially, gender and skin color, -blackness related to Africans and whiteness related to women from CSI- is at the center of discriminatory acts towards migrants. For instance, the killing of a Nigerian migrant under police custody in August 2008, attracted many critiques in the mainstream media towards the treatment of African migrants by the police.37

On the one hand, human rights of irregular migrants are not perceived as problematic by the media and state officials based on the assumption that „immigrants“ stay temporarily in Turkey and they will „disappear in time“ despite the fact that Turkey signed the „International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families“.38 Only tragic events such as transit migrants left at the Turkish borders or enslavement of sex workers are occasionally covered in the media.41 On the other hand, politicians tend to utter clearly exaggerated figures such as the existence of one million migrant workers in Turkey (Ğçduygü, 2004: 33). Another exaggerated figure was stated by the Prime Minister of Turkey who had threatened Armenian government with deporting 100,000 Armenian „illegal migrants“ in Turkey.42

Turkey-EU Relations and Turkey”s External Affairs within the Context of Migration

Turkey’s EU Accession process brought the topic of immigration to the centre of policy discussions (MIUMTIE, 2009: 21). The EU’s discourse on migration management and control has been effective in shaping Turkey’s policy making and governmental approaches towards

37 “Ölüm Yeri: Beyoğlu Emniyeti” (“Place od Death: Police Station in Beyoğlu”) (Milliyet, 30/08/2007); http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=40671, view date: July 2010
“Festus Okey Davası Tikandi” (“The Case of Festus Okey is Stuck”) (Taraf, 29/06/2010). http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/festus-okey-davasi-tikandi.htm, view date: July 2010
38 For other Conventions signed by Turkey concerning migration and human rights policies in general, see Table 13.
migration and asylum (MIUMTIE, 2009:vi-vii; 23). On issues such as border control, visas, external migration, asylum, police cooperation, the fight against organized crime and against terrorism, cooperation in the field of drugs, customs cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, Turkey is expected to be equipped to adequately implement the growing framework of common rules (Turkey 2005 Progress Report: 110). More concretely, the requirements for Europeanization include alignment of visa policies with the EU, stronger border management, implementing EU practices on migration and lifting geographical limitation (Tokuzlu, 2007:1-2).

A major and recurrent discursive element regarding migration and asylum salient in the European Commission’s annual progress reports is the role of Turkey as a country of „transit“ migration for „illegal“ immigrants to the EU.43 Turkey is positioned as a Buffer Zone between

42 “100,000 Ermeni’yi şimdilik idare ediyoruz” (“For now, we are tolerating 100,000 [non-citizen] Armenians”) (Hürriyet, 17/03/2010) http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/14130171.asp, view date: July, 2010.
43 Examples from Progress Reports follow as “As Turkey is a transit country for quite a number of illegal immigrants, mainly from Asia and northern Iraq, its refusal to conclude any readmission agreements, pleading constitutional grounds, is a serious problem” (Turkey 1998 Regular Report: 43-44). “Turkey is not a country of final destination: almost all the persons caught try to reach Western European countries and the majority of them are caught at the land border between Turkey and Greece at Edirne since most illegal immigrants try to enter Greece as a first step” (Turkey 1999 Regular Report: 36). “As regards migration, efforts need to be seriously stepped up to decrease the number of illegal persons who try to reach Western European countries” (Turkey 2000 Regular Report: 63-64). “Given the recognition of Turkey’s status as a transit country, a significant step in alleviating the immigration problem would be the adoption of cooperation measures with the EU in transit matters, in line with the proposals put forward by the EU to Turkey in July 2001. As a matter of priority, Turkey needs to strengthen the migrant sending countries and the „Fortress Europe“ and high migration inflows are putting pressure on the Turkish asylum and migration system. Hence, the EU expects Turkey to reorganize its migration legislation and conclude readmission agreements with source countries (Turkey 2009 Progress Report: 73-78). In this scope, readmission agreements are a widelyemployed Community method to prevent and control illegal migration, an instrument that is commonly used to tackle illegal immigration and increase cooperation with source or transit third countries.

In this vein, Turkey signed agreements with source, transit and arrival countries such as Syria, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Ukraine and Greece. While negotiations for readmission agreements with the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Hungary, Macedonia, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, and
Libya are continuing, readmission agreements are proposed to Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, China, Morocco, Mongolia, Israel, Georgia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria and Kazakhstan (Ççduygu et. al., 2009:253). It should be noted that some of these initiatives failed to get any response (Apap et. al., 2004). On the one hand, the signing of a bilateral agreement does not always guarantee its smooth functioning. Many problems were experienced in the implementation of Turkey”s re-admission agreement with Greece.44 On the other hand, signing an EC readmission agreement with Turkey is a priority for the EU. This agreement is put forth as a pre-condition for visa liberalization for Turkish nationals in the long term (Ççduygu, 2009:26). The formal negotiations are almost finalized and there will be a readmission agreement with the EU in late 2010.45

As outlined above, Turkish authorities have taken various steps to align with the acquis in the field of Justice and Home Affairs by controlling the migration flows to Turkey through improved border control mechanisms, changes in visa policies and specific laws (MIUMTIE, 2009:37). More systematic changes are also envisaged. Within this context, „Turkey”s Action Plan for Asylum and Migration” was prepared in 2005. Accordingly, a comprehensive codification of the Law on Asylum and the Law on Aliens should be concluded by 2012. The adoption of these two

efficiency of its fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings. In that respect the signing of a readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU would be a step in the right direction” (Turkey 2001 Regular Report: 81-86).

44 A report by Human Rights Watch based on interviews by Iraqis and other refugees/migrants draws attention to severe human right violations on the Turkish-Greek border including expulsions, inhuman and degrading conditions of detention, brutality and harassment by Greek/Turkish border guards, and the blocking of access to asylum along with the denial of asylum and other forms of protection to those in need” Greece/Turkey, Stuck in a Revolving Door, Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the Greece/Turkey Entrance to the EU”, Human Rights Watch, November 2008.

45 Personal communication, 2010

codes together with the issue of lifting the geographical limitation on 1951 Geneva Convention, however, has been postponed until the year 2012, arguably because of Turkey”s will to use these as a bargaining tool during the negotiation process with the EU (Ççduygu, 2009:25).

Having said this, it should be stressed that Turkey is a unique case not only because of the tripartite position it holds, but as a negotiating country with the EU, Turkey can no more be confined to the external dimension of the EU migration and asylum policy but will be incorporated into the „pan-European migration regime”, that aims at preventing all types of politically or socially unwanted migration into the EU (Geiger, 2008).
Thus, there is a „Turkish dilemma”: In line with the below-mentioned findings on public opinion, Turkish officials fear a situation where they may actually choose to cooperate with the EU in harmonizing their immigration and asylum policies, without this revision leading to actual membership. Many officials believe that Turkey’s security would be fundamentally undermined if Turkey were to adopt the Acquis without membership (KiriĢci, 2003). One should bear in mind that a re-codification of laws on asylum and foreigners is required to establish a more effective legislative framework to deal with the actual phenomenon of immigration (Ğçduygu, 2009:25).

Research Areas

General Information on the Provinces of the Research Areas

Afyon
The two areas chosen for the EUMAGINE Project, the research area with relatively high emigration, the subprovince of Emirdağ and the similar socio-economic area with relatively low emigration, the sub-province of Dinar, are located in the province of Afyon which has 17 sub-provinces and 394 villages. Afyon is spread over three geographical areas, the Mediterranean, Central Anatolia and mostly the inner part of the Aegean Region. With a surface area of 14,570 km², Afyon has ten mountains, nine plains, seven lakes and it is rich in thermal water at many locations which have become touristic destinations. The climate of Afyon, due to the far distance from the sea and the surrounding mountains, is continental and characterized by snowy winters, rainy springs and dry summers; the Southwestern parts of Afyon have softer climate.³⁹

Afyon’s economy is based mostly on agriculture and livestock. Socio-economically, Afyon is the 44ᵗʰ province among the 81 provinces of Turkey (SPO, 2003).⁴⁰ The urbanization rate of Afyon was 45.77 percent in the year 2003 and it was the 68ᵗʰ province among the 81 provinces ranked according to their urbanization rates.

The population of Afyon, today, is approximately 700,000 people. The birth rate in the year 2000 was 2.82 children (SPO, 2003) and the population growth rate in 2009 was 5.7 per thousand (TURKSTAT, 2009). The population in the sub-province centers today (mainly urban areas) is slightly higher than the population in Afyon’s town and villages (Table 14). While the province of Afyon has received 20,223 people from other provinces in Turkey, 22,256 people have emigrated from Afyon during the year 2009 (Table 15). Among the ones who migrated from Afyon, the number of males in the age group of 20-39 is 5,850 and the number of females in the same age group is 6,434. Among the people who migrated to Afyon, 5,457 are males and 5,680 are females in the age group of 20-39 (TURKSTAT).

According to the latest statistics of international emigration rates of Afyon calculated in the year 1990, the sub-provinces with highest international emigration rates are Emirdağ (14 percent), Hocalar (13.7 percent), Sandıklı (7.3 percent), Kızılören (6.8 percent) and Bayat (6.5 percent).

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⁴⁰ SPO stands for State Planning Organization, website http://www.dpt.gov.tr/DPT_portal, view date: June 2010
The sub-provinces with lowest international emigration rates are Çobanlar (0.9 percent), Dazkırı (1.2 percent), Ihsaniye (1.2 percent), Iscehisar (1.8 percent) and gühut (1.8 percent).

**Istanbul**

The research area selected for the EUMAGINE Project as the area with high immigration rates, Fatih, is located in the province of Istanbul in the Marmara Region. With a surface area of 5343 km², Istanbul is made up of 39 subprovinces, 782 neighborhoods and 152 villages. Istanbul is situated on two continents, Europe and Asia, and consists of four lakes and some small rivers. The province has a temperate climate with summers generally hot and humid, winters cold, wet and often snowy.  

Istanbul”s economy is based on industry and service sector. Socio-economically, Istanbul is the most developed province among the 81 provinces of Turkey (SPO, 2003). The urbanization rate of Istanbul is 90.69 percent in the year 2003 and it is the first province among the 81 provinces ranked according to their urbanization rates. 

The population of Istanbul today is approximately 13 million people. The birth rate in the year 2000 was 1.97 children (SPO, 2003) and the population growth rate in 2009 was 17 per thousand (TURKSTAT). The population in the sub-province centers (urban areas) is much higher compared to the population in town and villages (Table 16).

The province of Istanbul has received 388,467 people from other cities and 348,986 people have migrated from Istanbul during the year 2009 (Table 17). Among the ones who migrated to Istanbul, the number of males in the age group of 20-39 is 107,761 and the number of females in the same age group is 97,499. Among the ones who migrated from Istanbul, 180,086 are males and 72,535 are females in the age group of 20-39 (TURKSTAT).

According to the latest statistics of international emigration rates, the sub-provinces with highest international emigration rates are Adalar (5.8 percent), Bahçelievler (4.9 percent), Esenler (4.2 percent), Kağıthane (3.7) and Ümraniye (3.5 percent). The sub-provinces with lowest international

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41 Istanbul Municipality website, [http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Pages/AnaSayfa2.aspx](http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Pages/AnaSayfa2.aspx), view date: May 2010
emigration rates are Sarıyer (1.4 percent), Tuzla (1.5 percent), ğiĢli (1.8 percent), Beykoz (2.1 percent) and BeĢiktaĢ (2.2 percent) (TURKSTAT, 1990).

Van

The research area chosen for the EUMAGINE Project as the area with a specific human rights situation, Van Merkez, is located in the province of Van which borders with Iran and is in the Eastern Anatolia Region. Spreading over a surface area of 19,069 km², Van consists of 12 sub-provinces and 578 villages. In addition to seven rivers and many small size lakes, the largest lake of Turkey is also in the province of Van. Far from the sea and surrounded by mountains, Van has continental climate with long, snowy winters and hot summers. 42

Van”s economy is based on agriculture and livestock. Socio-economically, Van is the 75th province among the 81 provinces of Turkey. The urbanization rate of Van is 50.94 percent in the year 2003 and it is the 54th province among the 81 provinces ranked according to their urbanization rates (SPO, 2003).

The population of Van today is approximately one million people. The birth rate in the year 2000 was 6 children (SPO, 2003) and the population growth rate in 2009 was 17.7. The population in the towns and villages are higher than the population in the sub-province centers (mainly urban areas) (TURKSTAT) (Table 18).

The province of Van has received 22,866 migrants from other provinces of Turkey and 27,175 people migrated from Van during the year 2009 (Table 19). Among the ones who migrated from Van, the number of males in the age group of 20-39 is 7,478 and the number of females in the same age group is 5,986 (TURKSTAT).

According to the latest statistics of international emigration rates, the sub-provinces with highest international emigration rates are GevaĢ (1.5 percent), Saray (1.4 percent), ErciĢ (1.2 percent), Edremit (1.2 percent) and Van Merkez (1.2 percent). The towns with lowest international emigration rates are Çatak (0.5 percent), Çaldıran (0.6 percent), Bahçesaray (0.7 percent), BaĢkale (0.7 percent) and Gürpinar (0.9 percent) (TURKSTAT, 1990).

Research Areas

Research Area with High Emigration - Emirdağ in Afyon

Emirdağ, shown in the map of Afyon, has a surface area of 2,213 km² and consists of 70 villages, 5 towns and 25 neighbourhoods. The economy of Emirdağ is mostly based on agriculture and livestock. There are two factories in the sub-province; one is a flour factory and the other, a synthetic manufacturing factory. 43 In Emirdağ, there is one state hospital and ten health clinics. 44 There are 28 primary education institutions and 16 high schools. 45

Socio-economically, Emirdağ is the 390th sub-province among the 872 sub-provinces in Turkey. In the six levels of development, the first class being for the most developed subprovinces, Emirdağ is included in the third class. The urbanization rate of Emirdağ in 2004 is 43.27 and it is the 409th among the 872 sub-provinces in the level of urbanization. The unemployment rate in the same year is 4.15 percent (SPO, 2004).

In the local elections of 2009, the political party which won most of the votes (28 percent) was the AKP and following this political party (26 percent), was the MHP. 46

46 High Election Council, http://www.ysk.gov.tr, view date: July 2010
The number of census enumeration areas is 203 in the urban areas and 184 in the rural areas making a total of 387. The population of Emirdağ today is approximately 42,000 people and the population growth rate in 2009 was -19.8 per thousand. The population in the towns and villages is higher than the population in its center which is mainly urban (Table 20). The population density is 19.36 per km².

According to the latest statistics of 1990, out of the 11,108 households in Emirdağ at the time, 1,550 households had at least one family member living abroad and the number of the people living abroad was 4,851; making the international emigration rate 11 percent in the center of the sub-province and 15.7 percent in the villages and towns.

The total population of the age group of 15-39 in Emirdağ is 16,343 in 2009 (Table 21). The number of illiterate women in the age group of 18-39, is more than four times the number of illiterate men in the same age group in Emirdağ in 2009 (Table 22). The number of married women in Emirdağ is lower than the married men and the number of the divorced women is higher than men in 2009 (Table 23). There are many Alewites scattered in many of the villages of Emirdağ; however their number is not known as there is no available statistics on the religion or ethnicity in the country.

Brief Migration History

Emirdağ in Afyon is well known for its high emigration rates since the year 1963 when the first wave of laborers emigrated to Belgium. Although the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and Denmark have also received tens of thousands of immigrants from Emirdağ since the 1960s, the most popular destination has always been Belgium. Even after Belgium stopped accepting workers from Turkey in 1974, the migration to Belgium continued either by family reunification or by arrangement of tourist visas for relatives. Some, with an intention of migration, entered Belgium with a tourist visa and then overstayed or managed to acquire residence permit. Many emigrants have married their own relatives planning to get a divorce after the relative is able to receive residence permit. Another way of emigration is rooted in the fact that Turkish families in Europe prefer Turkish brides or grooms. As a result, many people in Emirdağ divorce from their spouses hoping to get married with an emigrant on holiday.

47 Census Enumeration Areas are not used since the year 2000 as Turkey has started using an online electorate system.
in Emirdağ. There are also those who make mutual agreements with European citizens who accept to get married with them in return of money (Timmerman, 2009).

Many of the emigrants who live in Europe return to Emirdağ in summer to spend their yearly holidays. The elderly, who have retired from their jobs in Europe, stay half of the year in Europe in order to continue getting social benefits from the country of immigration. With the emigrants returning in the months of July and August, the population of Emirdağ increases from approximately 40,000 people to more than 120,000 people. Due to the way the emigrants advertise Europe and prove their richness by building villas in Emirdağ or traveling with luxurious cars (which are sometimes hired), they have created an imaginary, rich Europe where money is easily earned. On the other hand, staying in or returning to Emirdağ from Europe is interpreted as defeat and loss. Even in the times of economical crisis in Europe, there were only a handful of people willing to return to Emirdağ to live.

Until the recession period in Europe starting from the year 2000, the number of emigrants returning for holidays was higher. However, due to the recession and the weakening of the third generation’s ties with Emirdağ, the number of returnees in summers is in a decreasing trend. Some people, even if they come to Turkey for summer holidays, prefer the Mediterranean coast rather than spending their time in Emirdağ. Until the recession in Europe, there was a trend of building luxurious villas in Emirdağ which created a job market; however, that has disappeared in the last ten years.

The people of Emirdağ who live abroad retain strong connections with their hometown. A social organization that is founded by the people who are from Emirdağ and who live in Europe is named EYAD, The Organization of Cooperation for people from Emirdağ, and is located in Belgium. With a wide range of activities including successful campaigns to help the people with low income, to provide wheelchairs for the disabled people or to build libraries for schools in Emirdağ. The social network among the people from Emirdağ in Europe and in Turkey is very strong as they have a number of websites as tools of news and communication and regular magazines in which they give news from Europe.

**Research Area with Low Emigration- Dinar in Afyon**

Dinar, shown in the map of Afyon, is a sub-province with surface area of 1,234 km² and is made up of 55 villages and 8 towns. The economy of Dinar is based on agriculture, livestock and trade. There are 21 factories including factories of textile, tin can, sack, flour, fish net, jeans and farm
implement factories.\textsuperscript{48} In Dinar, there are two state hospitals and twelve health clinics.\textsuperscript{49} There are 14 primary education institutions and 14 high schools.\textsuperscript{50}

Socio-economically, Dinar is the 369\textsuperscript{th} sub-province among the 872 sub-provinces in Turkey (SPO, 2004). In the six levels of development, the first class being for the most developed subprovinces, Dinar is included in the third class. The urbanization rate of Dinar in 2004 is 40.12\% and it was the 469\textsuperscript{th} among 872 subprovinces in the level of urbanization. The unemployment rate in the same year is 6.61\% (SPO, 2004). In the local elections of 2009, the political party which won most of the votes (51\%) was the MHP, and following this political party (30\%) was the AKP.\textsuperscript{51}

The number of census enumeration areas is 252 in the urban areas and 198 in rural areas, making a total of 450.\textsuperscript{52} Dinar’s population today, approximately 50,000 people, is slightly higher in the center which is mainly urban, compared to the population in the towns and villages (Table 24). The annual growth rate of population is 1.5 per thousand (TURKSTAT, 2009). The population density is 40.2 per km\textsuperscript{2}.

According to the statistics of 1990, out of the 14,494 households in Dinar, 375 households had at least one family member living abroad and the number of people living abroad was 831; making the international emigration rate 2.6\% both in the center and the villages.

In the total population of approximately 50,000 people in Dinar, the total of the age group of 15-39 is 18,043 people (Table 25). The number of illiterate women in the age group of 18-39, is almost three times the number of illiterate men in the same age group in Dinar in 2009 (Table 26). The

\textsuperscript{48} Afyon Governorship website, \url{http://www.afyonkarahisar.gov.tr/}, view date: May 2010
\textsuperscript{49} Afyon Municipality, \url{http://www.afyon-bld.gov.tr/tr/Tab.aspx?TabID=55}, view date: July 2010
\textsuperscript{50} Ministry of Education, \url{http://www.meb.gov.tr/index.asp}, view date: July 2010
\textsuperscript{51} High Election Council, \url{http://www.ysk.gov.tr}, view date: July 2010
\textsuperscript{52} Census Enumeration Areas are not used since the year 2000 as Turkey has started using an online electorate system.
numbers for both the married and the divorced women are higher than the men in Dinar in the year 2009 (Table 27).

Brief Migration History

The most crucial population movement in Dinar took place after the devastating earthquake in the year 1995. Due to the destruction of the province and the harsh winter conditions, people had to migrate to the nearby cities. After the houses were re-built by the government in the following years, many families started returning to their homes. The people who chose not to return to Dinar were mostly the residents of the center. This led to a new movement. As the center of Dinar was now emptier, people from the villages and the towns of Dinar slowly started moving to the center. Some started spending the winters in the center working and returning to their villages in the summer or working in the center during the day and returning to their house in the village after work. Dinar has recently become also a destination for the retired state employees who served in Dinar at a period in their lives and then chose to live in Dinar after their retirement.

Even before the earthquake in 1995, there has always been internal migration to neighboring cities from Dinar by individuals in search of employment. During the economic crisis of 2001, many individuals who had migrated to neighboring cities such as Denizli, Isparta and Antalya started returning to Dinar because they either lost jobs or were able to earn only very low wages, insufficient to live in those cities. As they had their families in Dinar, returning to Dinar was more practical as the life is comparatively cheaper. Today, there is still seasonal migration to Antalya on the Mediterranean coast where the young is able to find summer jobs.

In the history of Dinar, there was one significant wave of emigration. In 1971, there was a destructive flood which destroyed houses, lands and animals. As European countries at the time were asking for laborers from Turkey, many people who lost their properties in the flood traveled to work in Germany, France and Belgium as workers. The emigration in 1971 did not cause a chain movement. The emigrants did not sell their houses and lands as they aimed to return and for this reason, have made many new investments in Dinar. Today, no significant return is observed, except the elderly who retire from jobs in Europe and spend half the year in Europe in order to continue getting the benefits. Although the high numbers of emigration stopped at the end of the 1970s, today there are still people that emigrate by family reunification. Nevertheless, Dinar is the sub-province with one of the least numbers of immigrants in Europe when compared to other sub-provinces in Afyon.
The people of Dinar who live abroad have not ended their connections with their hometown. As the town of Haydarlı in Dinar had many who immigrated to Germany, in the year 2004 they founded a nongovernmental organization named Haydarlılar YardımlaĢma Dernegi (Association of Solidarity for people of Haydarlı); which has donation campaigns for the vulnerable people in Dinar. The network between Dinar’s residents and the people of Dinar in Europe is not very visible on any kind of media.

*Research Area with Immigration History- Fatih in Istanbul*

Fatih, shown in the map of Istanbul, has surface area of 15.6 km² and is made up of 57 neighborhoods. Fatih constitutes the old quarter of the province and therefore tourism plays an essential role in its economy (Fatih Municipality). In Fatih, there are eleven hospitals and thirteen health clinics. There are 44 primary education institutions and 34 high schools.

The sub-province of Fatih was not included in the socio-economic ranking of the State Planning Organization that was done in 2003 among 872 sub-provinces in Turkey. The reason for this was the exclusion of the sub-provinces that were under the Metropolitan Municipality because they were too developed compared to the rest of the sub-provinces and would cause errors in the comparison. As a part of the Metropolitan city, the urbanization rate of Fatih is 100 percent. The unemployment rate, however, is

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unknown. In the local elections of 2009, the political party which won most of the votes (43 percent) was the AKP and following this political party, was CHP (29.4 percent).

The number of census enumeration areas is 4,338 in the urban areas and there are no rural areas for census enumeration. According to the statistics updated on 10.05.2010, the population of the subprovince of Fatih is 433,796 people, consisting of 215,326 males and 218.47 females (TURKSTAT). The annual growth rate of population is 23.1 per thousand (TURKSTAT). The population density is 27,807 per km². The total number of the age group of 15-39 in 2009 is 187,150 (Table 28).

In the year 2009, the sub-province of Eminönü was added to the sub-province of Fatih. According to the statistics of 1990, out of the 82,268 households in Eminönü at the time, 1,886 households had at least one family member living abroad and the number of the people living abroad was 3,113; making the international emigration rate 2.3 percent. The sub-province of Fatih at the time had a total of 134,467 households with 4,509 households with at least one family member abroad and 7,236 people living abroad; making the international emigration rate 3.4 percent. The number of illiterate women in the age group of 18-39, is close to three times the number of illiterate men in the same age group in Fatih in 2009 (Table 29). Despite the fact that the number of married women in Fatih is lower than the married men, the number of the divorced women is higher than divorced men in 2009 (Table 30).

Brief Migration History

Fatih has been an internal and international migrant receiving sub-province since Istanbul was conquered by the Ottoman Empire under the rule of Fatih the Conqueror. Many neighborhoods are known to be populated with people from a certain origin. The people migrating from Roumeli (the part of the Ottoman Empire that remained in the continent of Europe) such as the migrants from Albania were traditionally settled in this area, in the neighborhood named Silivrikapı and the migrants from Bulgaria were resettled in Cibali. The Arabs migrating from the East were resettled in Tahtakale. Armenians who were part of the long established residents of the region, though their numbers have decreased dramatically in time, have lived in Langa and Kumkapı. Migrants from many cities in Turkey were resettled in various neighborhoods. The ones from Bursa, a province in Marmara Region, were resettled in Yenikapı and Eyüp, those

56 High Election Council, http://www.ysk.gov.tr, view date: July 2010
57 Census Enumeration Areas are not used since the year 2000 as Turkey has started using an online electorate system.
from Konya, a province in Central Anatolia, were resettled in Aksaray. Today, when the migrants are ranked according to their numbers, the migrants from Kastamonu, a province in the Black Sea Region, have the largest number in Fatih.

Migrants of Turkic origin and the Muslim migrants from Balkans and Caucasians are scattered in various neighborhoods of Fatih. This sub-province receives many legal and irregular migrants and refugees who live in Laleli, Kadirga and Aksaray neighborhoods. Many irregular migrants from Somalia, Congo, Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Iraq and Azerbaijan live in the decaying housing areas in the neighborhoods in Eyüp, especially in the neighborhood of Niğanca. Laleli and Yenikapı are well known for receiving many migrants from Russia, Ukraine and Moldova who are mostly involved in suitcase trade.

Research Area with a Specific Human Rights Situation - Van Merkez in Van

Van Central Sub-province (Van Merkez), mentioned as „Van” in the map of the province of Van, has surface area of 2,289 km² and is made up of 2 towns, 92 villages and 23 „mezra”s“ (a few houses built close to each other). The economy of Van Merkez is based on industry, agriculture and livestock. Van Merkez has 62 factories active in various sectors ranging from cement to food production. In Van Merkez, there are nine hospitals and thirteen clinics. In Van Merkez, there are 89 primary education institutions and 90 high schools.

The State Planning Organization under the Turkish Prime Ministry has declared in its most recent socio-economic ranking in 2003 that Van Merkez was the 149th sub-province among the 872 sub-provinces in Turkey. In the six levels of development, the first class being for the most

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developed sub-provinces, Van Merkez was included in the second class. The urbanization rate of Van Merkez in 2004 was 79.79 and it was the 37th among 872 sub-provinces in the level of urbanization. The unemployment rate in the same year was 21.39 percent (State Planning Organization, 2004).

In the local elections of 2009, the political party which won most of the votes (54 percent) was a pro-Kurdish political party named DTP, closed by the Constitutional Court in 2009 due to assumed connections with the PKK, an armed separatist Kurdish group, and re-founded as BDP. Following this political party (39 percent), was AKP.61

The number of census enumeration areas is 3,608 in urban areas and 695 in rural areas, making a total of 4,303.62 The population of Van Merkez today, approximately 450,000 people, is higher in the center which is mainly urban compared to the population in the towns and villages (Table 31). The annual rate of population growth is 51.4 per thousand (TURKSTAT, 2009). The population density is 197 per km².

According to the statistics of 1990, out of the 28,689 households in Van Merkez at the time, 352 households had at least one family member living abroad and the number of the people living abroad was 539; making the international emigration rate 1.2 percent in the center of the sub-province and 1.4 percent in the villages and towns. According to the update on May 2010, Van Merkez has 201,274 people aged between 15 and 39 in a total population of 451,333 people (Table 33). According to the statistics of Turkish Statistical Institute, the number of illiterate women in the age group of 18 to 39, is more than four times the number of illiterate men in the same age group (Table 33). Out of the 64,204 men in Van Merkez, 26,021 are married and 224 are divorced whereas both the marriage and divorce rates in women in the age group of 20-39 are close to double the numbers in men in 2009 (Table 34).

Brief Migration History

The issue of migration in Van should be viewed under a few headlines. First of all, Van is a generator of internal migration since 1960s and also a station for internal migrants from the neighboring cities planning to go to the more developed western cities of Turkey. At the same time, the province of Van, especially Van Merkez, receives internal migration, mainly from the

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61 High Election Council, [http://www.ysk.gov.tr](http://www.ysk.gov.tr), view date: July 2010

62 Census Enumeration Areas are not used since the year 2000 as Turkey has started using an online electorate system.
cities in Eastern Turkey and due to its location on the Iranian border acting as an entrance point; it is the first stop and temporary residence for migrants from Asia and the Middle East; mainly for Iranians and Afghans aiming to apply for asylum in Turkey or aiming to reach European countries by other ways. There is also a movement from the towns and villages to Van Merkez due to the more desired living conditions in the center. Finally, there have been Kurdish political activists who fled from Turkey to apply for asylum in Europe due to the human rights violations that Van’s population experienced in the recent years and which have been witnessed by the many human rights organizations settled in this province to observe the situation of the Kurdish population (see Historical Background, 1980-2000).

Van has generated migrants to the rest of Turkey, to cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Bursa, Adana, Ankara and Antalya since the 1960s, however, this movement gained momentum in the 1980s. The first who left for the other cities were mostly from Van Merkez, who were better educated and living in better economic situations compared to the rest of the province. The reason they left was the starting of the armed clashes between the autonomy seeking Kurdish militants named PKK and the Turkish army. There has never been a significant wave of return to the province by this first wave, nor have they had any effect on the development or the economy of the province. After this first wave, more people started migrating to other cities for better and safer living conditions as Van was being damaged highly by the clashes between the Turkish Government and the PKK. Although the armed clashes between the PKK and the state has decreased since the year 2000, still there is high migration from Van to other cities. Out of more than the 27,000 people who left Van in the year 2009, approximately 10,000 people went to Istanbul, Ankara and Antalya (TURKSTAT). In the recent years, also observed was the seasonal migration by younger people from Van Merkez to cities such as Antalya on the Mediterranean Coast for temporary summer jobs. There have also been a number of Kurdish political activists who fled from Turkey due to the fear from the authorities regarding their connection with PKK. There has not been a major chain movement and among the people who left Turkey, only some took their families with them. The applications of asylum were usually to northern European countries, Germany, France and Belgium.

Van Merkez, in return, faced migration from the towns and the villages of Van who came here for safer living conditions. Also witnessed was the movement of some of these migrants to other cities by using Van Merkez as a station. In addition to the migration from inside of Van to Van Merkez, especially between the years 1985-1995, Van received high numbers of migrants from other cities in the east such as MuĞ, Ağrı, Hakkari, şişnakk. Due to the evacuation of many villages
in those cities by the Turkish army against the PKK, waves of internally displaced people, especially of Kurdish origin, moved to Van Merkez.

Lastly, due to its geographical location and as a satellite city, there are 1,025 asylum seekers and 1,019 refugees who entered Turkey through the Iranian border to apply for asylum in Turkey. Approximately seventy percent of this population are Afghans whose stay in Iran is illegal and almost all of the rest is Iranians.

The population of the province of Van and Van Merkez is mostly Kurdish; however, as the Turkish State does not collect information on the ethnicity of its people, there is no certain ethnicity information. Still, it is known that in the migration wave to other cities starting from the 1980s, it was mostly the Turkish population that left and the population migrating to Van from eastern cities such as Muğ, Ağrı, Hakkari, Şırnak was mostly of Kurdish origin. These movements naturally increased the Kurdish population in Van and in Van Merkez.

Conclusion

This report has given an overview of Turkey’s past and current political and socio-economic situation with an emphasis on its migration history and policies. The demographic, political and socio-economic situation in the four research areas selected for the EUMAGINE project are presented in a comparative fashion in order to provide background information to surveys and fieldwork to be conducted in these areas. The report mainly relies on official reports and academic research published on the subject of migration in Turkey. Within the framework provided by this report, we hope that the research conducted in selected areas will make a beneficial contribution to the existing literature. Given the historical legacy and multidimensional aspects of migration in Turkey, we believe that the insights on people’s perception of Europe which the EUMAGINE project aims to reveal would be of great interest to scholars and policy makers.

63 Van is among the 30 satellite cities in which the Turkish Ministry of Interior permits the asylum seekers and refugees reside with the obligation of attending signature duty regularly.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>12,941</td>
<td>13,290</td>
<td>18,511</td>
<td>31,139</td>
<td>56,860</td>
<td>71,997</td>
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<td>Greeks</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Armenians</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>Others</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>15,998</td>
<td>13,630</td>
<td>18,790</td>
<td>31391</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of non-Muslims</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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Sources: From 1914 to 1965, Ottoman and Turkish censuses and statistical abstracts; from 1990 to 2005, personal communication of the (opinion) leaders of non-Muslim communities to the authors.

Table 2: Turkey’s Human Development Index (1990, 1995, 2000 and 2007)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>HDI value/ranking</td>
<td>.717</td>
<td>.782</td>
<td>.742</td>
<td>.806</td>
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<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>73/173</td>
<td>69/174</td>
<td>85/173</td>
<td>79/177</td>
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<td>Adult literacy rate (percent ages 15 and older)</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>71.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined gross enrolment ratio, percent</td>
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<td>82.3</td>
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<td>GDP per capita, (PPP US$)</td>
<td>4,652</td>
<td>5,516</td>
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<td>GDI value/ranking</td>
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<td>GEM value/ranking</td>
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Table 3: Some Key Economic Indicators in Turkey (2000-2009)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Billion US$)</td>
<td>265.4</td>
<td>196.7</td>
<td>230.5</td>
<td>304.9</td>
<td>390.4</td>
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<td>648.6</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td>4.7</td>
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<td>Per Capita Income (US$)</td>
<td>2,986</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>2,584</td>
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<td>Domestic Debt Stock (Billion US$)</td>
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<td>182</td>
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<td>Foreign Debt Stock (Billion US$)</td>
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<td>114</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>144</td>
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<td>170</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>249</td>
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<td>Inflation (Consumer Price Index) (% year end)</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
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<td>1,413</td>
<td>1,165</td>
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<td>1,506</td>
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<td>Total No. of Unemployed (thousand)</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>2,385</td>
<td>2,388</td>
<td>2,328</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>2,611</td>
<td>3,471</td>
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<td>Unemployment Rate (%)</td>
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<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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<td>14.0</td>
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<td>No. of Underemployed (thousand)</td>
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<td>1,341</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>1,081</td>
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<tr>
<td>Underemployment Rate (%)</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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Sources: Obtained from the various reports of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) or formerly State Institute of Statistics (SIS), the State Planning Organisation (SPO), the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT), and the Ministry of Treasury (MoT).
Table 4: General and Local Elections in Turkey (1999-2009)

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### Table 5: Turkish Citizens Abroad (1985, 1995 and 2005)

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<th>Percent</th>
<th>1985 # (x 1000)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>1995 # (x 1000)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>2005 # (x 1000)</th>
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*Source: Figures above are derived from various sources of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (TÜSİAD, 2006: 62).*


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### Table 7: Asylum Movement from Turkey according to Countries of Destination (1981-2005) (persons)

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### Table 8: Turkish Emigrants by Period of Arrival in Europe (1983-1994)

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<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>27.6</td>
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8: Turkish Emigrants by Period of Arrival in Europe (1983-1994)
Table

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<td>231.8</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td><strong>397.6</strong></td>
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*Source*: Estimated from various reports of OECD-SPREMI and EUROSTAT (NIDI 1999: 47).

9: Turkish Asylum Seekers by Period of Arrival in Western Europe (1983-1994)

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<td><strong>Total West Europe</strong></td>
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*Source*: Estimations based on various reports of UNHCR, OECD-SOPEMI and EUROSTAT (NIDI, 1999: 48).
### Table 10: Migration from Turkey In Terms of Destination Country (1961 – 2005) (Persons)

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<td>%</td>
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<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>97.7</td>
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**Source:** Data compiled by İçduygü (2006) from various official statistics sources (TÜSİAD, 2006: 64).
### Table 11: Indicative Number of Migration to Turkey (1997–2008)

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<th>Undocumented Migration</th>
<th>Illegal entries</th>
<th>Overstays</th>
<th>Asylum application</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Residence Permit</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Study</th>
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<td>3,914</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>131,594</td>
<td>25,475</td>
<td>22,197</td>
<td>135,365</td>
<td>255,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>64,290</td>
<td>45,462</td>
<td>20,275</td>
<td>7,640</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>3,470</td>
<td>183,757</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>28,597</td>
<td>127,429</td>
<td>253,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>65,737</td>
<td>20,275</td>
<td>20,275</td>
<td>12,981</td>
<td>2,217</td>
<td>6,904</td>
<td></td>
<td>174,926</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 12: Remittances, GNP/GDP*, Exports, Trade Deficit**, and Share of Remittances in Trade Deficit, Exports, and GNP (1965–2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>GNP/GDP</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Trade Deficit</th>
<th>As a % of GNP</th>
<th>As a % of exports</th>
<th>As a % of trade deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>11,633</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>-108</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>-360</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>47,452</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>-3,338</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>63,391</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>-4,999</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>66,891</td>
<td>8,255</td>
<td>-2,975</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>150,758</td>
<td>13,626</td>
<td>-8,955</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>x1000</td>
<td>GDP (mil US$)</td>
<td>x1000</td>
<td>GDP (mil US$)</td>
<td>x1000</td>
<td>GDP (mil US$)</td>
<td>x1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3.327</td>
<td>170,081</td>
<td>21,636</td>
<td>-13,152</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4.560</td>
<td>265,384</td>
<td>27,774</td>
<td>-26,727</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.786</td>
<td>196,736</td>
<td>31,334</td>
<td>-10,064</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.936</td>
<td>23,049</td>
<td>36,059</td>
<td>-15,495</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>30,490</td>
<td>47,253</td>
<td>-22,087</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>390,387</td>
<td>63,167</td>
<td>-34,373</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>481,497</td>
<td>73,476</td>
<td>-43,298</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>526,429</td>
<td>85,535</td>
<td>-54,041</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>648,754</td>
<td>107,272</td>
<td>-62,791</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>742,094</td>
<td>132,027</td>
<td>-69,936</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>617,611</td>
<td>102,128</td>
<td>-38,771</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 2000; GDP indicators are used instead of GNP. **In million US$

Sources: Compiled by İçduygu (2006) based on various official sources in Turkey

### 13: Selected International Instruments regarding Migration and Human Rights signed by Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Ratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14: Population in the Province of Afyon, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population in 2009</th>
<th>Received Migration</th>
<th>Given Migration</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
<th>Net Migration Speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afyon</td>
<td>701,326</td>
<td>20,223</td>
<td>22,256</td>
<td>-2.033</td>
<td>-2.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: The Migration Statistics of the Province of Afyon, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total Population of Afyon</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afyon</td>
<td>701,326</td>
<td>348,194</td>
<td>353,132</td>
<td>167,384</td>
<td>170,225</td>
<td>337,609</td>
<td>335,132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Population in the Province of Istanbul, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population of Istanbul’s Town/Villages</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total Population of Istanbul</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,915,158</td>
<td>6,498,997</td>
<td>6,416,161</td>
<td>12,782,960</td>
<td>6,431,947</td>
<td>6,351,013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17: The Migration Statistics of the Province of Istanbul, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population in 2009</th>
<th>Received Migration</th>
<th>Out Migration</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
<th>Net Migration Speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>12,915,158</td>
<td>388,467</td>
<td>348,986</td>
<td>39,481</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 18: Population in the Province of Van, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of The District Centers in Van</th>
<th>Population of Van’s Town/Villages</th>
<th>Total Population of Van</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>527,525</td>
<td>273,051</td>
<td>254,474</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: The Migration Statistics of the Province of Van, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population in 2009</th>
<th>Received Migration</th>
<th>Out Migration</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
<th>Net Migration Speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>1,022,310</td>
<td>22,866</td>
<td>27,175</td>
<td>-4,309</td>
<td>-4,21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Population in the Sub-province of Emirdağ, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of the Center of Emirdağ</th>
<th>Population of Emirdağ’s Towns and Villages</th>
<th>Total Population of Emirdağ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,253</td>
<td>9,995</td>
<td>10,258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21: Population Statistics of the 15-39 Age Group in Emirdağ in 2009, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age distribution</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-39</td>
<td>16,343</td>
<td>8,290</td>
<td>8,053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: The Statistics of Literacy (able to read and write) /Illiteracy in the Age Group of 18-39 in Emirdağ, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group of 18-39</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Literate</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6,461</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>7,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>6,390</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>6,799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23: The Civil Status of People between Ages 20-39 In Emirdağ, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Never Married</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th>Spouse Deceased</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>3,646</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>2,289</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6,253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24: Population in the Sub-Province of Dinar, Updated On 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of Dinar’s Center</th>
<th>Population of Dinar’s Town and Villages</th>
<th>Total Population of Dinar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,155</td>
<td>12,273</td>
<td>12,882</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 25: Population Statistics of the 15-39 Age Group In Dinar In 2009, Updated On 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age distribution</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-39</td>
<td>18,043</td>
<td>8,945</td>
<td>9,098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26: The Statistics of Literacy (able to read and write)/Illiteracy in The Age Group Of 18-39 In Dinar, Updated On 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group of 18-39</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Literate</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7,223</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>7,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>6,325</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>7,853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27: The Civil Status of People between Ages 20-39 In Dinar, Updated On 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Never Married</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th>Spouse Deceased</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>4,546</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>5,397</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7,049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28: Population Statistics of the 15-39 Age Group In Fatih In 2009, Updated On 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age distribution</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-39</td>
<td>187,150</td>
<td>95,915</td>
<td>91,235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 29: The Statistics of Literacy (able to read and write)/Illiteracy in the Age Group Of 18-39 in Fatih, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group of 18-39</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Literate</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>76,161</td>
<td>8,331</td>
<td>85,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,431</td>
<td>75,910</td>
<td>4,896</td>
<td>81,237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30: The Civil Status of People between Ages 20-39 In Fatih, Updated On 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Never Married</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th>Spouse Deceased</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41,876</td>
<td>34,590</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>78,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>27,864</td>
<td>3,732</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>74,512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 31: Population in the Sub-province of Van Merkez, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of Center of Van Merkez</th>
<th>Population of Town and Villages in Van Merkez</th>
<th>Total Population of Van Merkez</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Male</td>
<td>Total Female</td>
<td>Total Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360,810</td>
<td>185,903</td>
<td>451,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174,907</td>
<td>90,323</td>
<td>232,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46,288</td>
<td>44,035</td>
<td>218,942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32: Population Statistics of the 15-39 Age Group in Van Merkez in 2009, updated on 10.05.2010 (TURKSTAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age distribution</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-39</td>
<td>201,274</td>
<td>104,643</td>
<td>96,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Never Married</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29,423</td>
<td>26,021</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15,557</td>
<td>40,512</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Asylum Seekers In Turkey (1997-2008) (MIUMTIE, 2009:19)

Figure 2: Top 10 Apprehended Cases Between 1995 And 2008 (MIUMTIE, 2009:11)